mythsthe people23andMe2023consumer genomics

everyone assumed:

our customers' passwords are their own responsibility

what was actually true:

When one account can read across the network to thousands of others, the password on that single account stops being a personal matter and becomes a structural one.

how it happened

  1. whoattackersold breach password lists
  2. the gapreused passwords~14,000 accounts opened
  3. thenlinked profilesone account reads its relatives
  4. the result6.9M people exposed$30M settlement
the gap that let it happen the result

what everyone assumed

A platform offers two-step verification and recommends a strong, unique password, and from there the account is the customer’s to protect. This is a reasonable division of labor, and it is how almost every consumer service draws the line. The login form cannot tell whether the person typing knows the password or merely bought it.

what happened

From roughly April into September, attackers worked through lists of email-and-password pairs leaked from older, unrelated breaches, trying them one at a time. Most failed. About 14,000 accounts opened, because the people behind them had reused a password that was already circulating. Each successful login was, by the system’s own measure, a normal customer signing in.

step by step

  1. April to September 2023old leaked passwords are tried one by oneAttackers work through email and password pairs from unrelated breaches. Most fail.
  2. about 14,000 accounts openTheir owners had reused a password that was already circulating. Each login looks like a normal customer.
  3. DNA Relatives and Family Tree widen the reachOne opened account can read the shared profile data of everyone it is connected to.the assumption breaks here
  4. data tied to about 6.9 million people is exposedAround 5.5 million through DNA Relatives and 1.4 million through Family Tree. A 30 million dollar settlement follows.

how it surfaced

The 14,000 accounts were never the point. A feature called DNA Relatives let one opened account read the shared profile data of everyone it was connected to, and Family Tree extended the reach further. Through those 14,000 doors, information tied to roughly 6.9 million people was exposed, around 5.5 million through DNA Relatives and 1.4 million through Family Tree. The company later agreed to a 30 million dollar settlement.

When one account can read across the network to thousands of others, the password on that single account stops being a personal matter and becomes a structural one.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour customers log in to your client portal with an email and a password they chose.
the gap nobody seesSome of them reuse the password they use everywhere else, and the portal lets anyone try as often as they like.a password is the only lock
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersSomeone feeds in a list from an old, unrelated breach. A few dozen accounts open, each looking like a normal login.
    what it costs youEvery opened account can see shared project files, so a handful of logins becomes most of your client list.
  2. or it goes like this
    howAn old password opens a data store that never required a second step.
    what leavesthe whole database in one downloadwho ends up with itan extortion group
    it happenedThe Snowflake wave, 2024
  3. or it goes like this
    howA stolen password gets through the one remote-access door without a code.
    what leavescontrol of the systems customers rely onwho ends up with ita ransomware crew
    it happenedChange Healthcare, 2024

sources

  1. 23andMe to Pay $30M for Credential Stuffing Hack Settlement, BankInfoSecurity
  2. 23andMe class action data breach settlement, HIPAA Journal

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Find the place in your product where one compromised account reaches the most other people's data, and ask what currently stands between a reused password and that reach.

    Your product almost certainly has a feature where one account can see data belonging to other accounts: a shared workspace, a team directory, a relationship graph, an org-wide search. The assumption to retire is that account security ends at each individual login. The honest answer is often a single login form that cannot tell the difference.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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