how it happened
- whoTraderTraitornamed by the FBI
- the gapSafe developer laptoplive AWS sessions taken
- thenBybit's signersscreen showed a routine transfer
- the resultabout $1.5B in ETHBybit stayed solvent
what everyone assumed
A multisig wallet exists so that no single person can move the money. Bybit kept its ether in a cold wallet that needed several signers to approve any transfer, and each signer reviewed the transaction before approving it. This is the textbook answer to insider risk and to a single stolen device. If one signer is compromised, the others still have to agree, and they will only agree to what they can see.
what happened
On 21 February 2025, during what Bybit described as a planned transfer from its Ethereum multisig cold wallet to a hot wallet, the signers approved a transaction that changed the wallet’s smart contract logic. In Bybit’s words, the attack “masked the signing interface”. More than 400,000 ETH and stETH moved to an address the attackers controlled, according to BleepingComputer’s reporting of Bybit’s account.
What the attackers compromised was the interface the signers read. Bybit’s signers used Safe{Wallet}, a widely used multisig product, and its web app had been altered. Verichains and Sygnia, the firms that investigated for Bybit, found malicious JavaScript served from Safe’s AWS storage. It only activated for Bybit’s wallet and left every other customer alone. Sygnia found the files had been modified two days before the theft, and that clean versions replaced them about two minutes after the transaction executed.
The way in was a laptop. Safe’s preliminary report, published in early March 2025 with Mandiant and reported by CryptoSlate and Decrypt, traces the start to 4 February 2025, when a Safe developer’s macOS workstation was compromised through a Docker project that contacted a malicious domain. Mandiant believes the developer downloaded it as a result of social engineering. Safe’s AWS setup asked for multi-factor authentication again every 12 hours. The attackers tried to register their own MFA device and failed, so they used the developer’s active AWS session tokens instead, which kept working as long as the sessions stayed live. From there they could change the code that Bybit’s signers would later read.
step by step
- Bybit moves ether out of cold storage through Safe{Wallet}Several signers approve each transfer in the wallet's web app.
- 4 February 2025a Safe developer's laptop is compromisedSafe's preliminary report ties it to a Docker project the developer added; Mandiant believes social engineering.the assumption breaks here
- the attackers ride the developer's AWS sessionsThey fail to add their own MFA device, so they use the session tokens already open on the laptop.
- malicious code goes into the Safe web appIt only fires for Bybit's wallet; Sygnia found the files changed two days before the theft.
- 21 February 2025Bybit's signers approve a routine-looking transferMore than 400,000 ETH and stETH leave; the FBI names TraderTraitor five days later.
how it surfaced
The transfer emptied the wallet in plain view on the Ethereum blockchain, and Bybit detected the unauthorised activity the same day. On 26 February 2025 the FBI attributed the theft to North Korea and named the activity TraderTraitor, putting the amount at approximately $1.5 billion, then the largest crypto theft on record. Bybit said it remained solvent and replenished its ether reserves. Safe rebuilt its infrastructure, rotated all credentials, and restricted privileged access to a few developers, with source code separated from infrastructure management.
The same group was assessed by analytics firms as behind the Binance theft in October 2026, which also began, according to Binance, on an engineer’s laptop.
A multisig wallet is only as honest as the screen every signer reads.
Several careful people checking the same screen add up to one check, if one outsider can change what the screen says. The approvers were independent of each other. The page they all trusted came from one developer’s laptop at another company.
picture it at a company like yours
The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.
- in this storythe day it mattersSomeone breaks into the maker's developer laptop and changes that page, for your company only.what it costs youBoth approvers see the right supplier and the right amount, and approve a payment to someone else.
- or it goes like thisit happenedSolarWinds / Sunburst, 2020howA genuine, signed update from a certified vendor carries a backdoor.what leavesa quiet way into your networkwho ends up with ita state intelligence service
- or it goes like thisit happenedtj-actions/changed-files, 2025howA build helper everyone uses is hijacked and its versions repointed.what leavessecret keys, printed into build logswho ends up with itanyone reading public logs
sources
- FBI IC3: North Korea responsible for $1.5 billion Bybit hack (I-022625-PSA)
- BleepingComputer: Lazarus hacked Bybit via breached Safe{Wallet} developer machine
- Decrypt: What caused Bybit's $1.4 billion Ethereum hack? New details revealed
- CryptoSlate: Safe's internal investigation reveals developer's laptop breach led to Bybit hack
your turn
what you can do about it
this week
For your biggest payment approval, check the amount and recipient somewhere other than the approval screen.
Two approvers on the same banking or payment tool see the same page, so a change to that page fools both. Pick your largest regular payment flow and add one confirmation that does not pass through that page: the bank's own notification, a call to a known number, or the bank app on a phone. Bybit's signers approved what the altered interface showed them, and the transaction that went through was a different one.
go deeper
if you're not sure where to start
Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.
open the checklist →
