mythsthe peopleCo-op Group2025retail / united kingdom

everyone assumed:

catching an intruder within minutes keeps the damage small

what was actually true:

Co-op spotted the hijacked account within minutes and kept ransomware out, yet member data was still copied, and the company's own accounting puts its estimated profit hit down to switching off its own systems to keep the attackers out.

how it happened

  1. whoa caller posing as a colleagueanswered security questions
  2. the targeta reset on knowledge checksused maliciously about an hour later
  3. how it stoppedCo-op cuts its own accessVPN, remote access, then one network zone
  4. the resultdata copied, systems darkCo-op estimates £107m profit impact
where it was aimed where it stopped

what everyone assumed

Speed is what incident plans are built to deliver. Detect fast, contain fast, and the intruder leaves with little. It is a reasonable belief, because some of the worst stories on record are the ones where attackers sat unseen for months, and Co-op had prepared for exactly the fast response that the belief describes. Its technology chief told MPs on 8 July 2025 that the leadership team had war-gamed this exact scenario, that forensic firms were already on contract and that paid red team exercises fed into its security budget.

What the belief leaves out is what containment itself costs, and what can leave in the first hour.

what happened

The account came from a reset. In evidence to the Business and Trade Sub-Committee on 8 July 2025, Co-op Group’s Chief Digital Information Officer, Rob Elsey, said the attacker was able to impersonate a colleague and answer a number of security questions to get that colleague’s account reset. Malicious use began about an hour after the reset. Co-op did not say through which channel the reset was requested. Reuters reported on 6 May 2025, relaying a BleepingComputer report, that attackers had impersonated employees when contacting the IT help desks of M&S and Co-op; both companies declined to comment, so the help desk detail rests on press reporting that Co-op has not confirmed.

Detection worked. Elsey said the initial attack took place on Friday 25 April 2025, that a colleague account was seen acting maliciously, and that automated alerts reached the team within minutes. The next 12 to 24 hours were spent locking accounts out.

Then Co-op started switching off its own access:

  • The Sunday. Co-op restricted VPN access and remote access to its systems to keep the attackers out. Elsey said some colleagues could not work remotely for certain systems as a result.
  • A few days later. Software inside the network tried to reach an attacker’s website, which Elsey described as the point where ransomware is typically downloaded. Co-op blocked it, then paused all communication “within that zone” until the root cause was found, because one bad connection could hide among thousands a minute.
  • The rebuild. The intrusion had reached a number of the main controllers. Co-op held the block for about a week while it rebuilt roughly 40 key pieces of equipment, and restored service around 14 days after the attack, Elsey said.

Group Secretary and General Counsel Dominic Kendal-Ward told the same hearing that these steps prevented the deployment of ransomware. He also said member names, addresses, contact details and dates of birth were copied in that short window, and that Co-op established this on Friday 2 May 2025, the same day as the additional close-down that brought the operational impact. Chief executive Shirine Khoury-Haq said on BBC Breakfast on 16 July 2025, as reported by BleepingComputer and The Register, that the data of all 6.5 million members had been taken.

Attribution is reporting, and Co-op has not named anyone in any source opened for this page. BleepingComputer reported that the BBC heard from a DragonForce operator that one of its affiliates was behind the attack, which is the attacker’s own claim. The Register wrote that Scattered Spider is believed to be behind it. On 10 July 2025 the National Crime Agency arrested four people aged 17 to 20 over the attacks on M&S, Co-op and Harrods, on suspicion of offences including Computer Misuse Act offences and blackmail. Arrests are not charges, and The Register reported on 16 July 2025 that none had been charged at that stage.

step by step

  1. a colleague's account can be reset by answering questionsCo-op's technology chief told MPs the attacker impersonated a colleague and answered a number of security questions to get the reset.
  2. 25 April 2025the account turns hostile and is flagged within minutesCo-op's systems alerted the team within minutes of the first malicious activity, and staff spent the next 12 to 24 hours locking accounts out.
  3. 27 April 2025Co-op switches off its own remote accessOn the Sunday, Co-op restricted VPN and remote access to its systems to keep the attackers out, and some staff could no longer work remotely.
  4. 2 May 2025member data turns out to have been copiedForensics established that member data had been accessed, Co-op told members and the market the same day, and an additional close-down of systems that week brought the operational impact.the assumption breaks here
  5. 26 March 2026the bill arrives in the annual resultsCo-op estimated a £285m direct impact on revenue and a £107m impact to profitability, describing it as the result of restricting its own systems.

how it surfaced

The containment was visible first. Kendal-Ward told MPs that online sales, payments and stores kept running because those systems sit on separate parts of the network. The back office did not. Distribution centres went back to manual processes, food ordering to stores ran on continuity plans for two weeks, Funeralcare staff worked on paper, and the legal services business stopped taking new clients because its staff log on through the remote access that had been locked down. Independent co-operative societies supplied by the group felt the knock-on effect in the depots.

The bill came later, in the company’s own words. Co-op’s 2025 results release of 26 March 2026 put an estimated £285m direct impact on revenue and an estimated £107m impact to profitability, made up of £86m of margin and £21m of one-off costs, and attributed the impact to the group having restricted its own systems. The same release put revenue at its wholesale arm, which supplies other co-operative societies, down 5.4%, partly on stock availability problems during the incident, and pointed to a tail of changed shopping habits in its own stores afterwards. Kendal-Ward had told MPs that Co-op chose not to insure specifically against this event and did not expect a significant insurance recovery. He also said Co-op paid no ransom and never engaged with the attackers.

Set next to Marks & Spencer in the same weeks, where ransomware did run, the two outcomes look different and arrive at the same place: weeks of a business working by hand. At Co-op the switch was pulled by its own team, on purpose, and the company’s results attribute the cost to that choice.

Fast detection decides whether the attacker stays. What you have to switch off to be sure, and what left in the first hour, decide the bill.

Co-op’s segmentation is why stores and payments kept working while the rest went dark, which is the question the blast radius guide asks about any single account. The reset that started it is the subject of the help desk reset guide, and keeping an admin account that still works on the day normal sign-in is blocked is what the emergency account guide covers. If you had to cut remote access tonight, which parts of your business would still run?

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour IT person resets passwords for anyone who can confirm a few personal details about themselves.
the gap nobody seesNobody has written down which systems you would switch off first, or what stops working when you do.a help desk that resets on request
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersAn intruder is spotted fast, and the only safe move is to cut remote access for everyone.
    what it costs youThe attacker is gone within days, while orders, deliveries and client work stay on paper for weeks.
  2. or it goes like this
    howA caller poses as an admin and gets a password and code reset in minutes.
    what leavesadmin control of identity and cloudwho ends up with itattackers who deploy ransomware
    it happenedMGM Resorts, 2023
  3. or it goes like this
    howAn outsourced desk resets an account three times without checking the caller.
    what leavesa fully working employee loginwho ends up with itan intruder who looks legitimate everywhere
    it happenedClorox and Cognizant, 2023

sources

  1. UK Parliament, Business and Trade Sub-Committee: Oral evidence, UK economic security, HC 835, 8 July 2025 (Co-op witnesses)
  2. Co-op: Co-op navigates headwinds and looks forward with confidence, clarity and purpose, 26 March 2026
  3. National Crime Agency: Retail cyber attacks: NCA arrest four for attacks on M&S, Co-op and Harrods, 10 July 2025
  4. Insurance Journal (Reuters): M&S, Co-op cyberattackers duped IT help desks into resetting passwords, report says, 6 May 2025
  5. BleepingComputer: Co-op confirms data theft after DragonForce ransomware claims attack, 2 May 2025
  6. BleepingComputer: Co-op confirms data of 6.5 million members stolen in cyberattack, 16 July 2025
  7. The Register: Co-op confirms all 6.5 million members had data stolen, 16 July 2025

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Write down what stops if you cut all remote access tonight, and who is allowed to give that order.

    Co-op's fastest safe move was to switch off VPN and remote access for its own staff, and its legal services team stopped taking new clients because that was how they logged on. List every system your people reach from outside the office, mark which ones the business cannot run a week without, and name the one person who can order the cut out of hours. While you are at it, check whether a password reset at your company can still be won by someone who knows a colleague's personal details.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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