mythsthe platformsSquarespace domains2024domain registration / cross-sector

everyone assumed:

our domain is safe where it is, because we set it up properly years ago

what was actually true:

When Google Domains customers were moved to Squarespace, the login in front of each domain became a new account at a new company, and in July 2024 attackers took over domains through it.

how it happened

  1. whoregistrar soldGoogle Domains accounts moved to Squarespace
  2. the gapthe new account loginset up by the move, never reviewed by owners
  3. thennameservers and DNS changedfrom 9 July 2024
  4. the resultphishing on real domainswallet drainers on project websites
the gap that let it happen the result

what everyone assumed

A domain is something you set up once. You pick a registrar, turn on two-step sign-in, point the records at your website and email provider, and stop thinking about it. For many companies that was Google Domains, which came with the comfort of a Google login.

That belief was reasonable. Registrars rarely change, and nothing about the domain itself looked different when one did. The assumption hidden inside it is that the account in front of the domain is the one you configured. When a registrar is sold, that stops being true, and nothing in your inbox says so in those words.

what happened

Squarespace agreed to buy the Google Domains business in June 2023 and announced on 7 September 2023 that the purchase was complete. Its press release said it would, after a transition period, transfer Google Domains accounts to its own platform. Owners did not choose a new login. Their accounts were moved for them.

dYdX, a crypto exchange, says in its own postmortem of 25 July 2024 that its domain was migrated from Google Domains to Squarespace on 15 June 2024.

From 9 July 2024 attackers got into Squarespace accounts that held crypto projects’ domains and changed where those domains pointed. BleepingComputer reported on 12 July that Compound Finance warned its users on 11 July that its main domain had been hijacked, and that Pendle and Unstoppable Domains were affected too. Celer Network said it caught the attempt on its own domains and restored its records; that outcome is Celer’s own statement. Visitors to hijacked domains were sent to phishing pages with wallet drainers, which empty a crypto wallet once the visitor approves a transaction.

How the attackers got in is disputed, and two versions are on the record:

  • Squarespace’s version. Its postmortem on its status page, dated 18 July 2024, says it saw suspicious activity from 9 July, suspended the affected accounts, reverted nameserver changes and deployed a fix on 12 July. It blames “a weakness related to OAuth logins” and says all compromised accounts used third-party OAuth, meaning sign-in through another company’s account. It says the migration made no changes to multi-factor authentication and that it found no evidence Google Workspace accounts were at risk.
  • The researchers’ version. Three researchers, samczsun, Taylor Monahan and Andrew Mohawk, published a report linked to the Security Alliance (SEAL) over the weekend of 13 and 14 July 2024. As reported by Krebs on Security and The Register on 15 July, they said Squarespace had linked the email addresses on each Google Domains account to the migrated domain in advance. An attacker who guessed one of those addresses could create a Squarespace account with a password before the owner did, and Monahan told Krebs that Squarespace did not require email verification for such accounts. They added that lower-privileged users such as a “domain manager” could also be used, because that role can still move a domain or change where it points.

Squarespace’s postmortem does not mention the pre-linked emails directly. It says accounts that signed in by email with an unverified address were not involved. No independent forensic report settles which version is right.

dYdX’s postmortem adds a second path. On 9 July attackers changed its nameservers from Cloudflare to another provider, and DNSSEC, which was still set at the registrar, stopped browsers from trusting the new answers. On 23 July 2024 the attackers came back, changed the nameservers again and removed DNSSEC. dYdX says Squarespace told it the cause was “a human-initiated reset by Squarespace’s customer service”, that the recovery bypassed two-step sign-in, that the other admins on the domain were not contacted, and that the new admin email was an outlook.com address belonging to the attacker. This is dYdX relaying what Squarespace told it.

step by step

  1. 7 September 2023Squarespace completes the Google Domains purchaseIt says it will move Google Domains accounts over after a transition period.
  2. 15 June 2024a domain moves with its accountdYdX's domain is one of those migrated; from here the door to it is a Squarespace login the owner did not design.the assumption breaks here
  3. 9 to 11 July 2024domains are taken overNameservers and DNS records change on crypto projects' domains, and some visitors land on wallet-draining pages.
  4. 12 July 2024Squarespace deploys a fixIts postmortem blames a weakness in OAuth logins; researchers describe a different cause.
  5. 23 July 2024dYdX is taken a second timeThis time through a reset by Squarespace's support team, according to dYdX's postmortem.

how it surfaced

The projects found out the way their users did: their own websites stopped being theirs. Compound, Celer, Pendle and Unstoppable Domains posted warnings on X between 11 and 12 July 2024, and BleepingComputer collected them on 12 July while Squarespace had not yet replied.

The scale is only known from outside. Krebs on Security wrote on 15 July 2024 that at least a dozen organisations with domains at Squarespace saw their websites hijacked. The SEAL researchers estimated, as quoted by SecurityWeek on 16 July 2024, that hundreds of cryptocurrency domains had been migrated and were exposed. Squarespace’s postmortem gives no count, only “a limited number” of customers.

The one loss figure on the record comes from dYdX. Its postmortem of 25 July 2024 says two users lost approximately $31,000 in the second hijack, to its knowledge at the time of publishing. On 24 July dYdX moved the domain to Cloudflare, a transfer it says took six hours.

The attackers here wanted crypto, so they pointed websites at wallet drainers. The same access, as SecurityWeek reported from the researchers, also allows email forwarding to be changed, which is the part any company would feel. Another domain that changed hands under the sites relying on it is on the record as Polyfill.io.

When your registrar changes hands, the lock on your domain is new, whatever the domain looks like.

Open the account that holds your domain today and ask whether you have ever seen the list of people who can sign in to it.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour company's domain sits at a registrar somebody picked years ago, and the website and email just work.
the gap nobody seesThe registrar is bought by another company, your account is moved for you, and nobody opens the new login to see who can use it.a connected app with standing access
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersSomeone else gets into that account first and points your domain somewhere new.
    what it costs youYour customers type your real address and reach a fake page, and your email can go with it.
  2. or it goes like this
    howA chat tool's key into your CRM is stolen from the vendor.
    what leavessupport tickets, including passwords pasted into themwho ends up with itan extortion group working through hundreds of companies
    it happenedSalesloft / Drift, 2025
  3. or it goes like this
    howIntegration keys to your code host are stolen from the integration vendor.
    what leavesyour private code and the secrets inside itwho ends up with itattackers looking for the next door
    it happenedGitHub OAuth tokens, 2022

sources

  1. Squarespace: Squarespace completes acquisition of Google Domains assets, 7 September 2023
  2. Squarespace status page: Domain Hijacking (postmortem, 18 July 2024)
  3. dYdX: DNS nameserver hijacking postmortem, 25 July 2024
  4. BleepingComputer: DNS hijacks target crypto platforms registered with Squarespace, 12 July 2024
  5. Krebs on Security: Researchers: Weak security defaults enabled Squarespace domains hijacks, 15 July 2024
  6. The Register: Squarespace fingered for DNS hijackings, 15 July 2024
  7. SecurityWeek: Hackers exploit flaw in Squarespace migration to hijack domains, 16 July 2024

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Sign in to your domain's registrar and list every user, role and recovery email on the account.

    Every company domain sits behind an account at a registrar, and former Google Domains accounts were moved behind a Squarespace login their owners never designed. Remove users who should not be there, turn on two-step sign-in for each one, check that the recovery email is a company address, and turn on the transfer lock and DNSSEC if your registrar offers them, as dYdX's postmortem shows DNSSEC blunted its first hijack. The [domain registrar guide](/read/domain-registrar) and [the founder departure guide](/read/founder-departure) cover whose name should be on that account, and [the helpdesk reset guide](/read/helpdesk-reset) covers the support desk that can still hand it to someone else.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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