mythsthe peopleTwilio (0ktapus)2022cloud communications

everyone assumed:

our staff won't fall for a text message

what was actually true:

A trained workforce reduces clicks; it never zeroes them, and an attacker only needs one.

how it happened

  1. who0ktapusSMS phishing
  2. the gapemployee credentialstyped into the fake page
  3. the result209 customers130+ companies targeted
the gap that let it happen the result

what everyone assumed

Phishing awareness focuses on email, so SMS feels like a lesser channel and a trained workforce feels like sufficient defense. The assumption is that people who know not to click a suspicious email also know not to type their password into a texted link.

what happened

Enough employees entered their credentials into the cloned page to give the attacker working logins. The same campaign ran the same playbook against more than a hundred other companies in parallel, harvesting credentials one convincing text at a time.

step by step

  1. employees get texts pointing to a cloned login page
  2. enough of them enter credentialsThe attacker gets working logins.the assumption breaks here
  3. August 2022209 customers and 93 Authy users affectedPart of 0ktapus, which hit 130 plus organisations.

how it surfaced

In August 2022 Twilio disclosed the breach: 209 customers and 93 Authy end users affected, part of the 0ktapus campaign that struck 130-plus organizations through SMS phishing.

A trained workforce reduces clicks; it never zeroes them, and an attacker only needs one.

The durable defense is a credential a cloned page cannot capture, not a workforce that never makes a mistake.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour staff get a text saying their login needs updating, with a link.
the gap nobody seesThe link goes to a perfect copy of your login page.a second factor that can be relayed
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersA few people enter their details, and the attacker is in.
    what it costs youCustomer data is reached, and the same trick hits dozens of companies that week.
  2. or it goes like this
    howA fake login page passes the password and code to the real site as they are typed.
    what leavesinternal documents, code and dashboardswho ends up with itthe attacker behind the page
    it happenedReddit, 2023
  3. or it goes like this
    howLogin prompts keep coming until a tired employee taps approve.
    what leavesadmin tools and company chatwho ends up with itan attacker who bought a contractor's password
    it happenedUber, 2022

sources

  1. TechCrunch, 2022

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Check whether your staff's second factor can be relayed through a fake login page.

    Your MFA, if it is a code or a prompt, can be relayed through exactly the kind of cloned page that caught Twilio. Phishing-resistant factors cannot. Which kind your staff use is the question this incident asks, and it is answerable today.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

the letter · every two weeks

one access gap in your inbox, with the fix.

Every issue takes one way access creeps in, shows a real incident where it went wrong, and ends with one thing to check that week. Written for the people who run the tools, without a security team behind them.

  • 1one mechanism, explained plainly
  • 2one real incident, taken apart
  • 3one step you can take on Monday

get the next issue

One email every two weeks. Your address stays here and is never passed to vendors. One click to unsubscribe. Privacy.