in this guide
  1. who can add an app
  2. what the token can reach
  3. why it outlives the person who added it
  4. where the tokens actually live
  5. the controls you already have

Picture a 90-person agency. Over three years, people have added a stand-up bot, a polls app, a meeting recorder, a translation bot, a CRM connector and two AI summarisers to the company Slack. Each took a minute. Nobody asked IT, because nothing asked them to. Three of the people who added them have since left.

Every one of those apps holds a token. Some of those tokens can join any public channel and read it. Unless an app’s developer turned on token rotation, its token does not expire on its own, and the departure of the person who clicked “Allow” does not switch them off. The chat app list is an access list that nobody is asked to read.

This guide is the chat version of the connected apps on your CRM: how Slack and Microsoft Teams apps get in, what their tokens can reach, why they outlive the person who added them, and the settings that put a person between a click and an install. For the general reason any OAuth grant survives a departure, see the token that lives forever.

who can add an app

In Slack, every member, unless someone changed it. Slack’s help centre says that by default any member of a workspace can install an app. A workspace owner can switch on “Require approved apps”; after that, members can install only approved apps and send a request for the rest, and restricted apps cannot be installed or requested at all.

Approving an app also approves its scopes. Slack’s app approval page says so directly. It also says apps installed before you turned approval on keep working until someone uninstalls them. Switching approval on today does nothing about the last three years.

In Teams, users can install too. Microsoft’s app centric management page says that for new organisations the default lets users install apps, and each app can be set to everyone, to specific users or groups, or to no one. Changes take up to 24 hours to reach everyone, per the same page.

Team owners can grant data access without an admin. Microsoft calls it resource-specific consent. When a team owner adds an app to a team, they can consent to permissions that apply to that team, including one that lets the app read and receive all of the team’s channel messages. Microsoft’s documentation notes that these permissions are not shown in the Entra admin center; you see them in the Teams admin center or in the app’s details inside Teams. A tenant-wide consent to an app’s Microsoft Graph permissions is different: Microsoft says only a Global Administrator can grant that.

what the token can reach

Slack issues two kinds of token that matter here, and they reach different things.

two tokens, two reaches

bot token (xoxb-)

belongs to the app

  • Reads public channels it has been added to, with channels:history
  • Can add itself to any public channel, with channels:join
  • Keeps working when the installer is deactivated
  • Posts as the bot

user token (xoxp-)

acts as the person who connected it

  • Sees what that person sees, private channels and DMs included, if granted groups:history or im:history
  • Can search the workspace, with search:read
  • Writes look as if the person wrote them
  • Revoked when the person is deactivated

The bot that reads every channel is two scopes. Slack’s scope reference defines channels:history as viewing messages and content in public channels the app has been added to. That sounds narrow until you read channels:join, a bot scope that lets the app join public channels in the workspace on its own. An app with both can walk into every public channel and read the history there. A summariser that works across channels needs something like this pair to do its job, so the request looks reasonable on the install screen.

The user token is the person. Slack’s token documentation says user tokens act on behalf of the user and their write actions look as if the user made them. A user token with search:read can run workspace searches as that person. If the person who connected it is an owner sitting in the finance and leadership channels, so is the app. Detectify’s 2016 research on leaked Slack tokens put it bluntly: a user token is “exactly like having the complete username and password for the user.” That was vendor research from 2016 and token types have changed since, but the user-token model it describes is still how Slack’s documentation explains it.

An incoming webhook is a secret too. It can only post to the one channel picked at install, per Slack’s webhook docs, which add that the URL contains a secret and should never be shared. Anyone holding it can post into that channel as your app. A fake “IT notice” posted under a trusted bot’s name could pass for the real thing.

The person who added the app chose its scopes once. The token keeps those scopes for as long as nobody removes it.

why it outlives the person who added it

how a chat app outlives its installer

  1. 1a member adds an appNo approval needed by default.
  2. 2they allow its scopesRead, join, post: whatever it asked for.
  3. 3they leaveTheir account is deactivated. Their user tokens go.
  4. 4the bot carries onIts token still works, and still sits on the vendor's servers.

Deactivating the installer does not remove the app. Slack’s developer documentation on current apps says the deactivation of an installing user “no longer has an effect on the app.” Slack’s help article on deactivated members adds that bot users, slash commands and incoming webhooks stay active, while the person’s own API tokens are revoked. So offboarding the person cleans up what acted as them and leaves what acted as the app.

The token does not age out. Slack’s token rotation guide says that without rotation an access token never expires. Rotation, when the app’s developer switches it on, makes access tokens expire every 12 hours and hands out single-use refresh tokens. That choice belongs to the app’s developer, so you cannot turn it on for someone else’s app from your admin settings.

Revoking is a separate act. Slack’s auth.revoke reference says revoking a bot token does not uninstall the bot user or the app; the bot user is deactivated and removed from its channels. Removing an app is done from the app’s page under Manage apps, where the Authorizations list shows which members connected their accounts and lets you revoke them, per Slack’s help article on removing apps.

The same pattern sits under flows people build in automation tools on their own logins, which the automation owner guide covers.

where the tokens actually live

The token an app uses to read your channels is stored by the app’s vendor. You can see the install. You cannot see how the vendor keeps the token.

When the vendor is breached, your token goes with it. In August 2025, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group reported that attackers had stolen OAuth tokens from Salesloft’s Drift platform and used them against customers’ Salesforce data. Its 28 August update said the compromise was not limited to the Salesforce integration, and it advised Drift customers to treat every token stored in or connected to the platform as potentially compromised, then review, revoke and rotate. The Drift record is about a CRM, but the shape is the one your chat apps share: one vendor holding tokens into many companies.

When a developer pastes it somewhere public, someone can find it. Detectify reported in April 2016 that it had found more than 1,500 Slack tokens in public GitHub repositories, gists and support tickets, and that the exposed workspaces held database and CI credentials, private messages and password files. Slack’s engineering blog said in June 2024 that since 2016 it has scanned for its own token and webhook formats exposed on the internet and invalidates them on discovery, then notifies the owner. That catches public leaks. A token in a private repository, a laptop or a vendor’s database is outside that scan.

What sits in the channels is the reason it matters. In the Disney chat leak, an attacker who got into one employee’s Slack account through a malicious download took data from thousands of channels, according to the plea agreement as reported by BleepingComputer on 1 May 2025. That was a person’s account. A user token connected by that person would have reached the same channels.

the controls you already have

Each of these is a setting in an admin console you already pay for.

Slack: require approved apps. Admin, then Apps and workflows, then App Management Settings, per Slack’s app approval page. Name one or two app managers so requests do not wait on a single owner. Allow members to request apps, so the request lands somewhere visible.

Slack: read the installed list. Tools and settings, then Manage apps, then Installed apps. For each app, open its configuration and look at the scopes and the Authorizations list. The words to look for are channels:join, channels:history, groups:history (private channels), im:history (direct messages), files:read and search:read.

Teams: set the default to off for third-party apps. In the Teams admin center, Manage apps, Org-wide app settings, the switch is called “Let users install and use available apps by default.” Then open the Permissions tab on the third-party apps people already use and check for resource-specific consent such as reading all channel messages.

Guests are a separate list. Outsiders in channels are people, covered in the guest list guide.

Which app in your chat could read the leadership channel today, and who would notice if it started?

sources

  1. Slack developer docs: tokens
  2. Slack developer docs: using token rotation
  3. Slack developer docs: channels:history scope
  4. Slack developer docs: channels:join scope
  5. Slack developer docs: groups:history scope
  6. Slack developer docs: im:history scope
  7. Slack developer docs: search:read scope
  8. Slack developer docs: differences between classic apps and granular Slack apps
  9. Slack developer docs: auth.revoke
  10. Slack developer docs: sending messages using incoming webhooks
  11. Slack Help Center: add apps to your Slack workspace
  12. Slack Help Center: manage app approval for your workspace
  13. Slack Help Center: remove apps and custom integrations from your workspace
  14. Slack Help Center: manage deactivated members' apps and integrations
  15. Slack Engineering: proactive measures against password breaches and cookie hijacking (June 2024)
  16. Detectify Labs: Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information (April 2016)
  17. Microsoft Learn: app centric management to manage user access to Teams apps
  18. Microsoft Learn: resource-specific consent for Teams agents and apps
  19. Microsoft Learn: grant and manage consent to Teams app permissions
  20. Google Threat Intelligence Group: widespread data theft targets Salesforce instances via Salesloft Drift (August 2025)
  21. BleepingComputer: hacker NullBulge pleads guilty to stealing Disney's Slack data (1 May 2025)