mythsthe platformsCitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777)2025-5777networking / enterprise remote access

everyone assumed:

if we run the cleanup commands in the bulletin, every stolen session is gone

what was actually true:

Citrix's June 2025 fix for CVE-2025-5777 came with two commands that end ICA and PCoIP sessions, while the flaw also reached VPN, RDP proxy and AAA setups, and researchers advised ending those sessions too.

how it happened

  1. whoan outside attackerno login needed
  2. the gapgateway memorycan hold other users' session tokens
  3. thenpatched, two session types endedICA and PCoIP closed by the bulletin's commands
  4. the resultother sessions left openVPN, RDP proxy and AAA outside those commands
the gap that let it happen the result

what everyone assumed

Citrix has not said what its customers believed, so this belief is an inference from the guidance. After CitrixBleed in 2023, the lesson that a patch leaves stolen sessions alive was well known. In June 2025 Citrix put the lesson into the bulletin itself: install the fixed build, then run two commands to end active sessions. An administrator who followed the bulletin line by line had every reason to think the cleanup was done, because the vendor had written the cleanup down.

what happened

On 17 June 2025 Citrix published bulletin CTX693420 for CVE-2025-5777, rated 9.3 under CVSS v4.0. Citrix describes it as insufficient input validation leading to memory overread. It applies when a NetScaler appliance is configured as a Gateway (VPN virtual server, ICA Proxy, CVPN or RDP Proxy) or as an AAA virtual server, the role that handles sign-in. Versions 12.1 and 13.0 are end of life and stay vulnerable.

The bulletin’s cleanup step is narrower than that list. It recommends two commands, kill icaconnection -all and kill pcoipConnection -all, which in Citrix’s words end “all active ICA and PCoIP sessions”, to be run once every appliance in the pair or cluster is upgraded. Nothing in the bulletin addresses VPN, CVPN, RDP proxy or AAA sessions. Its changelog shows no change to the commands since June 2025.

Researchers soon described what the memory could hold. Kevin Beaumont named the flaw CitrixBleed 2, according to BleepingComputer on 25 June 2025. watchTowr published an analysis on 4 July showing that a malformed login request returns a slice of the appliance’s memory. In its own tests it found no cookies or session IDs, and it said it believed busy production systems would leak more. Horizon3.ai wrote on 7 July that the leak can include session tokens, showed an administrator session token and plaintext credentials, and said it was not fully sure which of Citrix’s flaws its exploit covered. Citrix’s own blog of 15 July says session theft is “plausible but not guaranteed” and depends on configuration and traffic.

ReliaQuest, in vendor research on 26 June, said it assessed with medium confidence that the flaw was being exploited, and described hijacked sessions in which sign-in was granted without the user knowing, the same session reused from expected and suspicious addresses, and Active Directory reconnaissance afterwards. GreyNoise wrote on 16 July that exploitation began on 23 June, a date it reached by tagging earlier traffic after the fact.

On 17 July BleepingComputer reported that Beaumont advised ending other session types that may have been hijacked, among them kill aaa session -all and RDP connections. Arctic Wolf, in vendor research on 18 July, recommended the AAA and RDP commands and clearing load balancer persistent sessions, and said the original commands do not account for all session cookies the flaw leaks. Citrix has not said, in any statement opened for this page, that its two commands were incomplete.

step by step

  1. 17 June 2025Citrix ships the fix with a cleanup stepThe bulletin says to run two commands that end ICA and PCoIP sessions once every appliance is upgraded.
  2. 23 to 26 June 2025exploitation, then a denialGreyNoise later dates the first attempts to 23 June; Citrix writes on 26 June that it has no evidence of exploitation.
  3. 4 to 10 July 2025technical write-ups and a one-day deadlinewatchTowr and Horizon3.ai publish analyses; CISA adds the flaw to its catalog on 10 July with a due date of 11 July.
  4. 17 to 18 July 2025the cleanup list is called too shortKevin Beaumont, as reported by BleepingComputer, advises also ending AAA, RDP and other session types, and Arctic Wolf says the original commands miss some leaked cookies.the assumption breaks here

how it surfaced

Citrix’s blog of 26 June 2025 said there was no evidence of exploitation. CISA added CVE-2025-5777 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 10 July 2025 with a due date of 11 July for federal agencies, one day later, and the catalog now marks it as used in ransomware campaigns. Citrix updated its blog on 11 July to say it had seen no evidence at announcement and that CISA had since listed the flaw.

The catalog entries show how the cleanup dropped out of view. CISA’s 2023 entry for CitrixBleed told owners to apply the fix and kill all active and persistent sessions. The 2025 entry asks only for mitigations per vendor instructions, and the vendor’s instructions name two session types.

Citrix’s 15 July blog gives a way to look back: within one session, the client address should stay the same, and a change can point to theft, though it can also be a user switching from office to home Wi-Fi. The same blog warns that logs kept on the appliance may cover only a few days. Mandiant’s Charles Carmakal, quoted by BleepingComputer on 25 June, said ending sessions after updating is essential, recalling that many organisations skipped it in 2023. The pattern repeats on SharePoint in July 2025, where the secret that outlived the patch was a server key.

Ending sessions means ending every kind the device issues, and a vendor’s two-line list may cover fewer kinds than the flaw reached.

Ask whoever runs your gateway which session types it hands out, and which of them the last urgent fix actually ended.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour staff work from home through a remote access gateway that an outside IT firm keeps up to date.
the gap nobody seesWhen an urgent fix arrives, the firm installs it and runs the commands printed in the vendor's notice, and the ticket closes.a setting that leaves data open
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersThe notice ended two kinds of session, while a stranger is still riding a third kind copied from the gateway's memory the week before.
    what it costs youThat stranger keeps reaching your file servers as one of your employees, with no password or code asked, until someone ends every session by hand.
  2. or it goes like this
    howA share link meant for one folder opens the whole storage account.
    what leavesbackups, passwords and private messageswho ends up with itanyone who finds the link
    it happenedMicrosoft AI data exposure, 2023
  3. or it goes like this
    howA default on a no-code app leaves its data readable without logging in.
    what leavespersonal records you collectedwho ends up with itanyone who looks
    it happenedPower Apps misconfiguration, 2021

sources

  1. Citrix: NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway Security Bulletin for CVE-2025-5349 and CVE-2025-5777 (CTX693420), 17 June 2025
  2. CVE record CVE-2025-5777 (Citrix as CNA), published 17 June 2025
  3. NetScaler blog: NetScaler Critical Security Updates for CVE-2025-6543 and CVE-2025-5777, 26 June 2025, updated 11 July 2025
  4. NetScaler blog: Evaluating NetScaler logs for indicators of attempted exploitation of CVE-2025-5777, 15 July 2025
  5. CISA: CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog, 10 July 2025
  6. CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (JSON feed, catalogVersion 2026.11.10)
  7. ReliaQuest: Threat Spotlight: Citrix Bleed 2 Vulnerability in NetScaler ADC, Gateway Devices, 26 June 2025 (vendor research)
  8. watchTowr Labs: How Much More Must We Bleed? Citrix NetScaler Memory Disclosure (CitrixBleed 2 CVE-2025-5777), 4 July 2025 (vendor research)
  9. Horizon3.ai: CVE-2025-5777: CitrixBleed 2 Write-Up… Maybe?, 7 July 2025 (vendor research)
  10. GreyNoise: Exploitation of CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) Began Before PoC Was Public, 16 July 2025 (vendor research)
  11. BleepingComputer: New 'CitrixBleed 2' NetScaler flaw let hackers hijack sessions, 25 June 2025
  12. BleepingComputer: Citrix Bleed 2 exploited weeks before PoCs as Citrix denied attacks, 17 July 2025
  13. Arctic Wolf: Follow-Up: Updates on Actively Exploited Information Disclosure Vulnerability "Citrix Bleed 2" in Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway, 18 July 2025 (vendor research)

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    List every session type your remote access gateway issues, and write down the command or setting that ends each one.

    For a NetScaler that means asking about VPN, CVPN, RDP proxy, AAA and ICA sessions, and checking the list against Citrix's current documentation before anyone runs anything. In June 2025 the bulletin's two commands covered ICA and PCoIP, and researchers asked for AAA and RDP sessions to be ended too. Then check where the gateway's logs go: if they stay on the box, you may have only a few days to spot one session showing up from two addresses. [The guide on the box at the edge](/read/edge-devices) covers who owns these devices, [the token guide](/read/token-lives-forever) covers why each kind of session needs its own revocation, and [the session theft topic](/topics/session-token-theft) covers the wider problem. If an urgent fix landed tomorrow, which of your sessions would still be open the day after?

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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