in this guide
Most companies have moved their logins into one place. Email, files, the CRM and the HR system sit behind single sign-on, and when someone leaves, one switch turns them all off. The boxes at the edge of the network never made that move. The firewall, the VPN gateway, the Wi-Fi controller and the storage box in the cupboard each keep their own list of admin accounts, their own web page for managing them and their own update cycle.
Picture a 120-person firm. An outside provider installed the firewall six years ago. The admin password lives in the provider’s notes and in a spreadsheet the former office manager kept. The VPN has local user accounts for people who joined before the identity provider existed. A storage box holds scanned contracts and has a web page that answers from the internet, because someone wanted to reach files from home in 2020. Nobody at the firm thinks of any of this as access. It is “the network”.
This guide is about those boxes as identities: who holds their logins, whether their admin page is reachable from outside, and who hears when the vendor finds a hole. It pairs with the guide on admin rights your IT provider holds, because the provider is often the only one who knows the password, and with nobody remembers why that rule exists, which covers the rules inside the firewall.
Every box at the edge is a login that offboarding does not know about.
The edge device exposure topic has the numbers, and the office wi-fi password everyone who ever left still knows covers the smaller box in the office. On the record: Asahi, 2025, CitrixBleed 2, 2025, SharePoint ToolShell, 2025 and F5, 2025.
what the catalog of exploited flaws shows
CISA keeps a public catalog of vulnerabilities with reliable evidence of exploitation in the wild, the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The version released on 10 November 2026 (catalog version 2026.11.10) lists 1,779 entries. The catalog has no field for product type, so the count below groups entries by vendor and product name: firewalls, VPN and remote-access gateways and application delivery controllers in one group, routers, switches and wireless access points in a second, network storage (NAS) in a third. Email security gateways (13 entries) and cameras are left out.
That is about one entry in six. The ransomware flag stands out more. Across the whole catalog, 361 of 1,779 entries carry it, about 20 percent. In the firewall and VPN group it is 56 of 149, about 38 percent.
In the firewall and VPN group, Fortinet has 24 entries, Citrix 21, Ivanti 19, SonicWall 17, Cisco 15 and Palo Alto Networks 13. Read that list carefully. It counts known exploited flaws, and vendors with large installed bases and active research attention will always appear more often. It is no ranking of which brand to buy. It says that every common brand of edge box has had flaws used against real networks, so owning one means owning the job of watching it.
The joint guidance on edge devices published in February 2025 by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security with the UK, Australian, New Zealand and US agencies starts from the same place. The NCSC’s announcement of that series describes edge devices as entry points between internal networks and the internet, which is what makes them worth attacking.
three questions for every box
The vulnerability count is the vendor’s problem. The access around each box is yours, and it comes down to three questions.
the ways into one edge box
- local admin accountshared password from setup day
- admin web pageanswers from the internet
- local VPN userscreated on the box, outside the identity provider
- the provider's loginkept after the contract changed
- vendor cloud portalregistration, licences, sometimes config backups
- sign-in through your identity providerwhere the box supports it
usually outside any reviewusually known
Who holds the admin login? On most small-company firewalls the answer is one local account, often the default name, with a password several people have seen. The Canadian-led guidance asks for default credentials to be changed before deployment, for centralized authentication with role-based access, and for phishing-resistant MFA on all administrative access to the device. A shared local admin account meets none of the three, and it survives every departure. The topic on shared admin accounts covers why one login for several people erases the record of who did what.
Does the admin page face the internet? The same guidance says network management interfaces should not be directly exposed to the internet. Vendors say it in their advisories after the fact, as the next section shows.
Who gets the vendor’s security notices? The guidance tells owners to subscribe to security notifications from the device’s vendor. In practice the notices go to whoever registered the box, which is often the provider, a reseller or an employee who left.
the logins that live on the box
Local accounts on edge boxes behave like the identities you can’t offboard: created for a reason, never reviewed, valid for years.
Passwords carried over. In August 2025 SonicWall investigated a wave of intrusions through the SSL VPN on its Gen 7 firewalls. SonicWall’s notice, published on 4 August 2025 and last updated on 22 August 2025, said the activity was not a new zero-day. It tied it to CVE-2024-40766, a flaw patched a year earlier, and said it was investigating fewer than 40 incidents. Many involved migrations from Gen 6 to Gen 7 firewalls in which local user passwords “were carried over during the migration and not reset”. The patch was in. The old passwords were still there. SonicWall’s advice included resetting every local account with VPN access, removing unused accounts and enforcing MFA.
Accounts nobody can change. Some boxes ship with logins the owner cannot see. CISA’s catalog records a hard-coded account in Zyxel firewalls and access point controllers (CVE-2020-29583) with an unchangeable password, and a hard-coded credential in several D-Link NAS models (CVE-2024-3272). For the D-Link boxes the catalog’s instruction is to retire and replace them, because no fix will come.
Accounts the attacker adds. Fortinet’s advisory for CVE-2024-55591, published 14 January 2025, describes what intruders did after bypassing the login on FortiOS: they created admin accounts with random names, created local users, added them to SSL VPN groups and then logged in through the VPN. A patch removes the flaw. It does not remove those accounts. The live CitrixBleed incident page shows the same gap for stolen sessions, and the Colonial Pipeline page records how a dormant VPN account with no MFA was enough on its own.
the admin page that answers from the internet
how an exposed admin page becomes a way in
- 1admin page on the internetEnabled on the outside interface for remote support.
- 2login bypassedA flaw in the page skips the password entirely.
- 3new admin and VPN usersThe intruder writes their own access into the box.
- 4patched laterThe flaw closes. The added accounts stay until someone looks.
Two vendor advisories show why the second question matters.
Fortinet’s workaround for CVE-2024-55591 was to switch off the HTTP and HTTPS administrative interface, or limit the IP addresses that can reach it. Palo Alto Networks’ advisory for CVE-2024-0012, an authentication bypass in the PAN-OS management web interface published in November 2024, says the risk is greatly reduced if access to that interface is restricted to trusted internal IP addresses. Neither control requires a patch. Both require someone to know that the admin page is reachable and to decide who should reach it.
The question is easy to test. From a phone off the office Wi-Fi, try the firewall’s public address in a browser, on the usual admin ports. If a login page appears, so can anyone else’s scanner.
end of life: the patch that will never come
Every edge box has a date after which the vendor stops fixing it. After that date the box keeps working, keeps its logins and keeps its admin page, and every new flaw stays open for good.
The catalog says so in plain words. In the 10 November 2026 version, 32 of the 300 edge entries carry CISA’s note that the product is, or may be, past end of life, with the instruction to stop using or disconnect it. Most are small-office routers and NAS boxes from D-Link, TP-Link, NETGEAR and Zyxel. D-Link’s own notice of 4 April 2024 for the affected NAS models says they no longer receive software updates or security patches and recommends retiring and replacing them.
Routers become someone else’s infrastructure. The FBI warned on 7 May 2025 that end-of-life routers with remote administration switched on were being infected with a variant of the TheMoon malware and sold as proxies for criminals. Its advice was to replace them, or at least turn off remote administration.
Governments set deadlines for themselves. CISA’s Binding Operational Directive 26-02 of 5 February 2026 orders US federal civilian agencies to inventory edge devices that are past end of support, remove listed devices whose support ends by the 12-month mark, remove every identified unsupported device within 18 months, and from 24 months keep a running inventory and retire devices before their end-of-support date. Earlier, CISA’s Emergency Directive 25-03 of 25 September 2025 told agencies to permanently disconnect Cisco ASA firewalls whose support ended on or before 30 September 2025, after attackers were found modifying device memory to survive reboots and upgrades. Neither directive binds a private company. Both are a reasonable timetable to borrow.
who reads the vendor’s notices
The third question sounds administrative, and it is where edge boxes most often fall through.
The notice goes to the registration. SonicWall’s response to its MySonicWall cloud backup incident shows how much depends on that account. Its knowledge base article, first published 17 September 2025 and updated on 8 and 28 October 2025, says an unauthorized party accessed firewall configuration backup files for all customers who had used the cloud backup service. It says those files are a full snapshot of the device’s configuration, including credentials and secrets. Customers had to log in to MySonicWall to see whether their devices were listed. A company whose box was registered under a provider’s or a former employee’s account learns about that only if someone passes it on. The incident page on the cloud backup case tells the story, and the backup admin guide covers why stored configuration is access in its own right.
The portal is one more admin identity. The vendor’s cloud portal often holds licences, registrations and sometimes configuration. It belongs on the same list as the box’s local admin account, with a named owner and an address that outlives any one person.
The provider may be the only reader. If an outside firm runs your firewall, ask in writing who receives the vendor’s advisories, how fast they act on one, and how they tell you. The IT provider guide covers what else to ask about access they hold.
When the list is done, look at the column for who holds each admin password. How many of those names still work at the company?
on the record
- Asahi Group, 2025"the network box at one of our sites only puts that site at risk"
- CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777), 2025"if we run the cleanup commands in the bulletin, every stolen session is gone"
- F5, 2025"a break-in at our firewall vendor is the vendor's problem"
sources
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (JSON feed, catalogVersion 2026.11.10, released 10 November 2026)
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (about the catalog and its criteria)
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security with ASD, NCSC-UK, NCSC-NZ, CISA and NSA: Security considerations for edge devices (ITSM.80.101), February 2025
- NCSC-UK: Cyber agencies unveil new guidelines to secure edge devices from increasing threat, 4 February 2025
- CISA: BOD 26-02, Mitigating Risk From End-of-Support Edge Devices, 5 February 2026
- CISA: ED 25-03, Identify and Mitigate Potential Compromise of Cisco Devices (25 September 2025, V1 23 April 2026)
- FBI IC3: Cyber criminal proxy services exploiting end of life routers (I-050725-PSA), 7 May 2025
- SonicWall: Gen 7 and newer SonicWall firewalls, SSLVPN recent threat activity (4 to 22 August 2025)
- SonicWall: MySonicWall cloud backup file incident (17 September 2025, updated 28 October 2025)
- Fortinet PSIRT: FG-IR-24-535, authentication bypass in Node.js websocket module (CVE-2024-55591), 14 January 2025
- Palo Alto Networks: CVE-2024-0012, PAN-OS authentication bypass in the management web interface, November 2024
- D-Link: SAP10383, DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L and DNS-340L end-of-life notice, 4 April 2024
