in this guide
Every company keeps backups for one day: the day production is gone. Attackers plan for the same day. Once they hold an admin account, the backups are the thing standing between them and a ransom payment, so they go looking for them before they encrypt anything.
CISA’s #StopRansomware Guide, revised in October 2023 with the FBI, NSA and MS-ISAC, says it plainly: most ransomware actors try to find accessible backups and then delete or encrypt them, so that restoring is impossible without paying. The guide adds that attackers collect credentials inside the network and use them to sign in to the backup system itself.
So the question to ask about a backup is who can delete it. If the answer is the same admin login that runs production, the backup sits inside the blast radius of that login. This guide is about that overlap. It pairs with the device console guide, the other console that can destroy everything in an afternoon.
A backup that the production admin can delete is a copy with the same owner.
The backup deletion topic has the short version and the numbers.
why the backups go first
Sophos, a security vendor, surveyed 2,974 IT and security staff at organisations hit by ransomware for a report published in 2024. In that vendor research, 94% said the attackers tried to compromise their backups, and Sophos counted 57% of those attempts as successful. The numbers are self-reported, but they match what the government guidance describes.
The backup software is a target in its own right. CISA’s advisory on the Akira ransomware group, last revised on 13 November 2025, lists unpatched Veeam Backup & Replication servers among the ways Akira gets in, and describes the group deleting Windows shadow copies before encrypting. The machine that holds every copy of your data, with credentials to every server it backs up, is worth attacking first.
three ways one login reaches both
Picture an 80-person company with a cloud subscription for its servers, a backup product that copies them, and one IT lead plus an outside provider. Ask who can delete the backups and the answer is usually “only IT”. Then follow the logins.
where production admin reaches the backups
- same cloud account or subscriptionthe owner of production is the owner of the backup vault
- backup server joined to the domainany domain admin can sign in to the console
- provider's shared adminone account in the provider's vault for servers and backups
- sync dressed as backupencrypted files sync up and overwrite the good copy
- a locked or offline copyno production login can remove it before its date
reachable with production adminout of reach
The same cloud account. When backups sit in the subscription or account that holds production, whoever owns the account owns both. Code Spaces closed in 2014 after an attacker in its AWS console deleted production and backups together.
The backup server in the production domain. Many small setups join the backup server to the same Active Directory as everything else, because it is easier. Veeam’s own best-practice guide for its Microsoft 365 product ranks a separate management forest as the most secure choice and the production domain as the least, and asks for two-factor sign-in on the admin accounts.
The provider’s shared account. An outside IT provider often keeps one admin login for your servers, firewall and backup console in its own password vault. The IT provider guide covers who at the provider holds it. CISA’s guide asks that a third party running your backups follows the same practices, written into the contract.
Sync that looks like backup. CISA’s guide warns that automated cloud backups may not be enough: files encrypted on the laptop sync to the cloud and can overwrite the good versions. A synced folder follows its master.
what one stolen admin account did to the backups
Microsoft Threat Intelligence published a detailed account on 27 August 2025 of a group it tracks as Storm-0501 attacking an unnamed organisation’s Microsoft cloud. The backups were part of the plan from the start.
from a sync account to the backup vault, per Microsoft
- 1on-premises domain takenIncluding the server that syncs accounts to Microsoft Entra ID.
- 2a non-human Global Admin without MFAA synced account. Its password was reset on-premises and synced to the cloud.
- 3owner of every subscriptionThe attacker elevated access and gave itself the Owner role on Azure subscriptions.
- 4backups deletedSnapshots, restore points, Recovery Services protection and storage accounts.
- 5immutability held, partlyWhere policies blocked deletion, the attacker encrypted data instead.
Three details matter for a small company.
- The key was a service account. The Global Administrator role sat on a synced non-human account with no MFA method registered. The identity you can’t offboard explains why those accounts collect rights and escape review.
- The attacker removed the safety catches first. Microsoft reports that resource locks and storage immutability policies were deleted where earlier deletions had failed. A lock that the same Owner can remove only slows an attacker down.
- The locks that held still mattered. For resources still protected by immutability policies, Microsoft says the attacker turned to encryption. The copies that could not be deleted were the ones left.
The record has a harsher version on a smaller scale. CloudNordic, a Danish hosting provider, said in August 2023 that attackers had encrypted all server disks along with its primary and secondary backup systems, and that most customers lost all their data, as BleepingComputer reported on 23 August 2023. The company said infected servers had been connected to the wider network during a data centre move.
the quiet attack: shorter retention
Deleting a backup is loud. Changing how long backups are kept is a settings change. Anyone who can cut retention from 90 days to one day, or switch off soft delete, can let the copies expire on schedule, while the backup tool may still report every job as a success.
The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre treats this as part of the same problem. Its principles for ransomware-resistant cloud backups say destructive requests from customer accounts, including administrators, should be refused, with exceptions approved out of band. They ask for retention set in advance as a fixed period, and for alerts when global retention changes or a mass deletion is attempted. Those alerts should go somewhere that still works if your own systems are compromised.
So the list to keep has three verbs on it: who can delete backups, who can shorten retention or turn off soft delete, and who can change who else holds those rights.
locks the admin cannot open
The cloud platforms document controls built for exactly this. They differ in one thing: whether an administrator can undo them.
two kinds of protected copy
a lock the admin can lift
stops accidents and most users
- S3 Object Lock in governance mode
- Azure immutable vault, enabled but unlocked
- Resource locks the subscription owner can delete
a lock nobody can lift early
holds against a stolen admin
- S3 Object Lock in compliance mode
- Azure immutable vault, enabled and locked
- An offline copy, or one in a separate account with its own admins
AWS S3 Object Lock. AWS documentation says that in compliance mode a protected object version “can’t be overwritten or deleted by any user, including the root user”, and its retention period cannot be shortened. In governance mode, anyone holding the s3:BypassGovernanceRetention permission can override the lock, and the console sends that override by default.
Azure Backup immutable vaults. Microsoft Learn describes three states: disabled, enabled, and enabled and locked. Enabled blocks deleting recovery points early and cutting retention, but can be switched off. Locking makes it irreversible.
Azure Backup multi-user authorization. A separate resource, Resource Guard, has to approve critical operations such as disabling soft delete, cutting retention or turning off immutability. Microsoft’s documentation says a different user must own it and the backup admin must not hold rights on it. It can live in a different subscription, or in a different tenant for the strongest separation.
Most backup appliances and NAS boxes now offer some form of locked or immutable copy too. Check your own product’s documentation for one thing: whether an administrator can remove it before its date.
CISA’s guide adds a caution: immutable storage does not meet every regulation’s criteria, and a misconfiguration can be expensive. Locked means locked, so set the period with care and try it on one vault first.
the recovery day needs its own way in
NCSC’s second principle is that no single compromised account should be able to lock you out of your own backups. That means an out-of-band route: a separately authorised account, or credentials kept offline. In a real incident your directory, your email and your password manager may all be down, and you will need to sign in to the backup system without them. The break-glass guide covers how to keep such an account safe and tested.
Two more checks finish the picture. A backup that has never been restored is untested; GitLab in 2017 found out mid-incident. And the record of who changed retention or deleted a recovery point only helps if it is still there, which depends on how long your logs are kept. For SaaS data such as email and files, the SaaS backup topic covers the vendors’ own retention windows.
When the list is done, count the accounts that can reach both production and the backups. Would any one of them, stolen on a Friday night, leave you anything to restore?
on the record
- Asahi Group, 2025"the network box at one of our sites only puts that site at risk"
- SonicWall MySonicWall cloud backup, 2025"the firewall backup in the vendor's cloud is just a safety copy"
- Code Spaces, 2014"backups in the cloud mean we can always recover"
sources
- CISA, MS-ISAC, NSA, FBI: #StopRansomware Guide (revised 19 October 2023)
- NCSC: Principles for ransomware-resistant cloud backups
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Storm-0501's evolving techniques lead to cloud-based ransomware, 27 August 2025
- CISA: #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware, AA24-109A (revised 13 November 2025)
- BleepingComputer: Hosting firm says it lost all customer data after ransomware attack, 23 August 2023
- Sophos: The impact of compromised backups on ransomware outcomes (vendor survey, 2024)
- AWS documentation: Locking objects with S3 Object Lock
- Microsoft Learn: Concept of Immutable Vault for Azure Backup
- Microsoft Learn: Multiuser authorization using Resource Guard (Azure Backup)
- Veeam Backup for Microsoft 365 Best Practices: Workgroup or Domain?
