how it happened
- whoan attackerSonicWall later says state-sponsored, unnamed
- the gapthe vendor's backup storefirewall settings files kept in MySonicWall
- thenevery secret in the fileadmin and VPN passwords, TOTP, directory login, VPN keys
- the resultcustomers reset it allthe work falls on each customer and partner
what everyone assumed
Neither SonicWall nor its customers have said what they believed beforehand, so this belief is an inference from what happened. It is a sensible one. A firewall that dies takes the office offline, and rebuilding its rules from memory takes days. Saving the settings to the vendor’s portal means a replacement box can be back in an afternoon. The feature sits in the same portal as licences and firmware, whoever installed the firewall may have switched it on, and it reads as insurance. A copy you only open on a bad day does not feel like something an attacker would want.
The settings file is more than settings. SonicWall’s own knowledge base describes the export as a full snapshot of the device’s configuration, credentials and other secrets included. The general configuration is only encoded, so it is readable after a simple decode. Passwords and keys are encrypted one by one, with AES-256 on current models and 3DES on the older Gen 6 line.
what happened
SonicWall’s account came in stages, each one on its knowledge-base page with a dated change log:
- 17 September 2025. SonicWall disclosed that threat actors had accessed firewall preference files stored in its cloud backup service for fewer than 5% of its firewall install base. It described a series of brute force attacks aimed at the files, said the credentials inside were encrypted, and said it was not aware of the files being leaked online.
- 22 September 2025. CISA issued an alert repeating that the actor used brute force against the MySonicWall.com portal and that the files included information that could help attackers reach customers’ firewalls. CISA recommended that all SonicWall customers follow the advisory.
- 8 October 2025. SonicWall replaced the 5% figure. Its investigation with Mandiant had confirmed that an unauthorized party accessed the configuration backup files for all customers who had used the cloud backup service. SonicWall wrote that while the encryption held, “possession of these files could increase the risk of targeted attacks”.
- 4 November 2025. SonicWall said the Mandiant investigation was complete, that a state-sponsored threat actor was responsible, and that the access was limited to backup files in one cloud environment, reached “using an API call”. It said products, firmware, source code and customer networks were not affected, and that the incident was unrelated to the Akira ransomware attacks on firewalls running at the same time.
SonicWall has not named the actor, has not given a count of affected customers, and has not explained how the brute force of September and the API call of November fit together. Mandiant has not published a report of its own, so everything attributed to Mandiant here comes through SonicWall.
step by step
- firewalls save their settings to the vendor's cloudMySonicWall cloud backup keeps a copy of each firewall's full settings file, credentials included.
- early September 2025someone downloads the backup filesSonicWall says it detected suspicious activity around downloads of the stored configuration files.the assumption breaks here
- 17 to 22 September 2025SonicWall discloses, CISA alertsSonicWall puts the scope at fewer than 5% of its firewall install base and lists the credentials to reset; CISA tells all SonicWall customers to follow the advisory.
- 8 October 2025the scope becomes everyoneSonicWall says the Mandiant investigation confirmed access to the backup files of all customers who had used the service.
- 4 November 2025the investigation closesSonicWall attributes the access to a state-sponsored actor using an API call and says products and customer networks were not affected.
how it surfaced
SonicWall found the activity itself, and the cost landed on its customers. The reset list in SonicWall’s Essential Credential Reset article reads like an inventory of a small company’s access:
- every local user password on the firewall, admin accounts included
- the TOTP binding of every user, so everyone re-enrols their authenticator app
- the password of the account the firewall uses to look up users in the directory (LDAP), and the shared secrets for RADIUS and TACACS+
- the pre-shared keys of every IPsec VPN, which also have to change at each partner office or remote site on the other end
- SNMP credentials, cloud keys used for logging, and the email and FTP accounts the firewall sends reports to
The same article asks customers to cut off internet access to management, SSL VPN, IPsec VPN and SNMP before they start, so nobody logs back in with an old password mid-change. It warns that the same secrets may need changing at the internet provider, the dynamic DNS provider and the directory server. From 10 October 2025 the incident page also told customers that they are responsible for completing the updates, with support available for troubleshooting. Devices were sorted into priorities in the portal, with internet-facing ones first and anything that had not called home for 90 days marked inactive.
Whether any stolen file was used against a customer is not public. Huntress, in vendor research published on 10 October 2025, reported over 100 SonicWall SSL VPN accounts across 16 of its customer accounts logged into with working credentials from 4 October, and said it had no evidence linking that wave to the backup incident. Nobody has shown a link since.
Other records show the same shape at the edge. In CitrixBleed, patching the appliance left stolen sessions working until someone ended them. Here the device was fine and its secrets lived somewhere else.
A backup of a device is a copy of every key that device holds, kept wherever the backup lives.
The guides on the box at the edge and backups an attacker can reach cover who owns each, and the IT provider guide covers the provider who probably switched the feature on and would do the reset. The directory login in the file is one of the service accounts nobody offboards.
picture it at a company like yours
The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.
- in this storythe day it mattersThe vendor announces that someone downloaded those copies, and the email goes to an address at a provider you stopped working with long ago.what it costs youUntil someone resets every password and key in that file, an outsider may hold a map of your network and the secrets that open it.
- or it goes like thisit happenedSalesloft / Drift, 2025howA chat tool's key into your CRM is stolen from the vendor.what leavessupport tickets, including passwords pasted into themwho ends up with itan extortion group working through hundreds of companies
- or it goes like thisit happenedGitHub OAuth tokens, 2022howIntegration keys to your code host are stolen from the integration vendor.what leavesyour private code and the secrets inside itwho ends up with itattackers looking for the next door
sources
- SonicWall Knowledge Base: MySonicWall Cloud Backup File Incident (published 17 September 2025, updated 28 October 2025, with change log)
- SonicWall Knowledge Base: MySonicWall Cloud Backup File Incident, version of 17 September 2025 as archived by the Wayback Machine on 19 September 2025
- SonicWall Knowledge Base: Essential Credential Reset, updated 26 September 2025
- SonicWall: Cloud Backup Security Incident Investigation Complete and Strengthened Cyber Resilience, 4 November 2025
- CISA: SonicWall Releases Advisory for Customers after Security Incident, 22 September 2025
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: SonicWall security advisory (AV25-603), 18 September 2025, Update 1 of 9 October 2025
- Huntress: Threat Advisory: Widespread SonicWall SSLVPN Compromise, 10 October 2025 (vendor research)
your turn
what you can do about it
this week
Find out where your firewall's settings file is stored, and list the passwords and keys inside it.
Ask whoever manages your firewall, or log in to the vendor's portal yourself, and check whether configuration backups are kept there and who receives the vendor's security notices for that account. Then list what the file holds: admin and VPN passwords, the directory account the firewall uses, VPN keys shared with other sites. SonicWall's customers had to reset all of that in September and October 2025. If your copy left the building tomorrow, who would know which secrets to change, and how long would it take?
go deeper
if you're not sure where to start
Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.
open the checklist →
