in this guide
On 16 June 2026 emails began arriving in the inboxes of some staff at Huntress, a security company. They said Huntress’s data had been downloaded and gave it 48 hours to make contact. Huntress later wrote that the files were limited to its Salesforce data, and that on the evidence it had, its own products and infrastructure were untouched. The data had been read through the connection Huntress had once approved for Klue, a competitive-intelligence tool. According to Klue’s own summary of 1 July 2026, an attacker had used a previously compromised GitHub token on 11 June to plant code in Klue’s integration service, and that code collected customers’ Salesforce tokens. Klue had sent customers a general alert on 13 June. Huntress wrote that the alert did not say which customers were affected.
Versions of that sequence, a supplier hit and its customers left to work out what of theirs it held, run through at least eleven supplier incidents from 2024 to 2026. This essay reads them side by side: Snowflake, Salesloft Drift, Gainsight, Klue, Mixpanel, PingCAP, Instructure, SonicWall, Red Hat Consulting, Collins Aerospace and SimpleHelp. Each page tells one story. Read together, they describe one recurring day, and that day can be prepared for by a company with no security team.
The breach happens at the supplier. The incident happens wherever the supplier held something of yours.
four things a vendor holds of yours
Ten of those cases start with something the customer handed over, for a good reason at the time. There are four kinds, and they decide what the day looks like.
what a vendor can hold of yours
- a key into your systemsOAuth tokens into your CRM: Drift, Gainsight, Klue
- a copy of your datawhat your site or platform sent it: Mixpanel, Instructure
- secrets you handed overkeys in tickets, backups and project files: PingCAP, SonicWall, Red Hat by the attackers' claim
- a seat in your daily worksoftware your front line cannot run without: Collins, SimpleHelp
A key into your systems. Google’s threat intelligence team reported that from as early as 8 August 2025 to at least 18 August, an actor it tracks as UNC6395 reached Salesforce customer instances with OAuth tokens belonging to the Salesloft Drift chat app. On 20 August Salesloft and Salesforce revoked every active Drift token. In November 2025 Salesforce revoked the tokens of apps published by Gainsight after unusual activity through them, as AppOmni’s vendor research describes. In June 2026 Klue’s planted code gathered OAuth access and refresh tokens for Salesforce. In all three, the customer had approved the connection itself, once, and the connected apps guide covers how those approvals pile up.
A copy of your data. Mixpanel detected a smishing campaign, phishing by text message, on 8 November 2025. OpenAI, which used Mixpanel for analytics on its API platform, received details of the affected dataset on 25 November, according to BleepingComputer’s report of OpenAI’s notice. OpenAI said the data may have included names, email addresses, approximate location and organisation or user IDs of API users. What Mixpanel held was what OpenAI’s own pages had sent it. At Instructure in 2026, the company says the data involved included usernames, email addresses, course names, enrolment information and messages from schools that ran on its platform.
Secrets you handed over. Google’s report on Drift says the actor searched the stolen Salesforce data for AWS access keys, passwords and Snowflake tokens: secrets customers had left in their own CRM records. At PingCAP, the investigator NebuSec says the attacker collected credentials that customers had shared in Jira support tickets, AWS keys among them. SonicWall confirmed on 8 October 2025 that an unauthorised party had reached the firewall configuration backups of every customer who had used its cloud backup service. Its knowledge base describes each file as a full snapshot of the firewall’s configuration, credentials and other secrets included. Red Hat said on 2 October 2025 that an outsider had copied data from a GitLab instance its consultants used for client work. Its statement names project specifications and code snippets, and says nothing either way about credentials.
A seat in your daily work. RTX told the SEC that on 19 September 2025 it became aware of ransomware on systems supporting MUSE, the Collins Aerospace software airlines share for check-in and boarding, and that customers moved to back-up or manual processes. CISA’s advisory of 12 June 2025 describes ransomware actors using unpatched SimpleHelp remote-support servers to compromise the customers of a utility billing software provider. In both, the vendor sat between the customer and its own operations.
the vendor that was not breached
One case on the list belongs here because of what it was not. The Snowflake wave of 2024 carries a platform’s name. Mandiant’s report of 10 June 2024 says its investigation found no evidence that a breach of Snowflake’s enterprise environment caused the access. Every incident it responded to traced back to compromised customer credentials, on accounts without multi-factor authentication, and Mandiant and Snowflake had notified about 165 potentially exposed organisations. By their analysis, at least 79.7% of the accounts the actor used had prior credential exposure, and the earliest infostealer infection tied to a credential dated from November 2020.
That makes the first question on the day a precise one. Was the vendor broken into, or was your own account at the vendor used? The headline can read the same for both. The work differs: in the first case you cut the vendor’s access to you, and in the second you fix your own logins on the vendor’s platform, which the vendor login changes guide covers through Snowflake’s own move to MFA.
what the cases share
Set side by side, several of the records repeat four things.
The alarm came from somewhere else. Salesforce, the platform underneath, notified Klue on 12 June 2026. Mixpanel says it detected the smishing campaign itself, and Instructure says it detected the unauthorised activity in Canvas. At Brussels, the disruption showed up at the check-in desks. At Huntress, the attacker’s email was the first specific word.
The first notice was smaller than the last one. SonicWall’s knowledge-base change log shows the scope given on 17 September 2025 as under 5% of firewalls, replaced on 8 October by every customer who had used the cloud backup. Google’s Drift report, updated on 28 August 2025, widened its advice to treat any and all authentication tokens stored in or connected to Drift as potentially compromised. Mixpanel’s own post told customers that if they had not heard from it directly, they were not affected. That sentence is only as good as the contact list it was sent to.
the first notice and what came after it
first word
what the vendor said early
- SonicWall, 17 September 2025: under 5% of firewalls
- Klue, 13 June 2026: a general alert, no list of who
- Drift, 26 August 2025: Salesforce instances targeted
later word
what customers had to act on
- 8 October 2025: everyone who used the backup service
- 16 June 2026: extortion emails at a customer
- 28 August 2025: any token stored in or connected to Drift
The work landed on the customer. From 10 October 2025 SonicWall’s incident page told customers they were responsible for completing the required updates, and pointed them to its credential reset articles. PingCAP’s chief executive wrote on 23 October 2026: “Rotate anything you have shared with PingCAP support”. Instructure’s status update of 6 May 2026 advised customers to enforce MFA on privileged accounts, review admin access and rotate API tokens where applicable. In each of these cases, cleaning up what the vendor had held was left to the customer.
The vendor set the clock. Brussels Airport asked airlines to cancel half of the 276 departures planned for Monday 22 September 2025, AP reported, because Collins Aerospace “is not yet able to deliver a new secure version of the check-in system”. When a vendor runs part of your operations, the date you return to normal can be the vendor’s date.
before the email
A company without a security team can still know what each supplier holds, and the steps on the day start from that list.
Keep a short list of vendors with a key into you. Connected apps in the CRM, third-party apps with access to Google Workspace or Microsoft 365, apps and bots in company chat. The three lists essay calls this the fourth list, and the chat apps guide covers the bots. For each entry, write down where on your side the connection is revoked and who has the rights to do it.
Know what you have sent them. Search support tickets with your vendors for keys and passwords you pasted in, and ask whoever owns your website which user fields go to analytics and chat tools. Consultants and agencies count too: in the Red Hat case the attackers claimed to have found connection strings in client reports, so list the ones you emailed to a project.
Know who receives the notice. Instructure delivered detailed data reports only to security contacts each institution had designated, up to two per institution. Your other vendors send their notices somewhere too: an account owner, a billing contact or a named security contact. If it points to a person who left, or to an IT provider you no longer use, the notice can land with nobody. The IT provider guide covers the second case.
Have one manual fallback written down. For the one supplier your front line cannot work without, write how a normal day runs without its screens, as Brussels Airport had to over the weekend of 20 September 2025.
on the day
The first two steps do not depend on the vendor’s investigation, so they come first.
- Name what the vendor holds of yours, using the four doors above. A copy of your data and a key into your systems need different work.
- Cut the key from your side. You can revoke an integration’s tokens without waiting for the vendor to finish counting. Gong wrote on 19 June 2026 that it had deactivated all tokens tied to the Klue integration and blocked four IP addresses Klue gave it.
- Read what the key did. ReliaQuest’s vendor research on Klue describes scripts with a Python-urllib user agent and, in at least one environment, nearly a thousand queries in 15 minutes. Your CRM’s API and login history for the integration user is where that would show, if your plan keeps it long enough. The log export guide and the CRM export guide cover what you can see.
- Rotate what you handed over. Every key in a ticket, backup or project file that still works gets changed, including the ones the vendor has not mentioned.
- Warn your people and customers about targeted phishing. OpenAI’s notice, as BleepingComputer reported it, warned that the Mixpanel data could be used for phishing or social engineering. PingCAP said the same. A stolen contact list is raw material for convincing emails.
- Keep a dated log of what you knew and when. Whether you must notify customers or a regulator is a question for a lawyer, and the log is what that conversation starts from.
Huntress learned the shape of its incident from an attacker on a Tuesday. If one of your three vendors emailed tomorrow, who at your company would open it, and how long would it take them to cut its key?
on the record
- Klue, 2026"a token from a project nobody works on anymore can't open anything that matters"
- Collins Aerospace, 2025"each airport's check-in desks run on that airport's own system"
- Gainsight / Salesforce, 2025"the salesloft breach was a one-off, and that lesson belongs to somebody else"
sources
- Google Cloud / Mandiant: UNC5537 targets Snowflake customer instances for data theft and extortion, 10 June 2024, updated 17 June 2024
- Google Threat Intelligence Group: Widespread data theft targets Salesforce instances via Salesloft Drift, 26 August 2025, updated 28 August 2025
- AppOmni: Salesforce Gainsight unauthorized access security advisory, 20 November 2025 (vendor research)
- Klue: CrowdStrike Investigation Summary and Security Improvements, 1 July 2026
- Huntress: Cybercrime Breaches Klue: Salesforce Data Impacted for Many Victims, including Huntress (18 June 2026, updated to 24 June)
- ReliaQuest: Klue Integration Abused in Salesforce Data Theft, June 2026 (vendor research)
- Gong: Klue Security Incident, 19 June 2026
- Mixpanel: Our response to a recent security incident, 27 November 2025
- BleepingComputer: OpenAI discloses API customer data breach via Mixpanel vendor hack, 27 November 2025
- PingCAP: A Note from Our CEO on Our Security Incident, 23 October 2026
- NebuSec: Investigating the PingCAP Security Incident: Credential Exposure and Cloud Data Collection, 21 October 2026
- Instructure: Security Incident Update & FAQs (updates 29 April to 29 September 2026)
- Instructure status page: Confirmed Security Incident (1 to 6 May 2026)
- SonicWall Knowledge Base: MySonicWall Cloud Backup File Incident (published 17 September 2025, with change log to 28 October 2025)
- Red Hat: Security update, incident related to Red Hat Consulting GitLab instance, 2 October 2025
- RTX Corporation, Form 8-K, event date 19 September 2025 (SEC filing)
- AP via NBC News: Airport cyberattack disrupts more flights across Europe, 21 September 2025
- CISA: Ransomware Actors Exploit Unpatched SimpleHelp Remote Monitoring and Management to Compromise Utility Billing Software Provider (AA25-163A), 12 June 2025
