mythsthe platformsSimpleHelp2025IT services and software providers / united states

everyone assumed:

our provider's remote-support server is our provider's problem

what was actually true:

In 2025 attackers broke into SimpleHelp remote-support servers that providers had left unpatched for months, and used them to push ransomware to the providers' customers.

how it happened

  1. whoransomware actorsDragonForce in the Sophos case, unnamed in CISA's
  2. the gapthe provider's SimpleHelp serverversion 5.5.7 or earlier, fix out since January 2025
  3. thencustomer networks mappeddevice names, users, network connections
  4. the resultcustomers encrypted and robbedfiles locked and data copied out
the gap that let it happen the result

what everyone assumed

None of the companies involved has said what it believed, and none of them has been named, so this belief is an inference from what happened. It is a natural one. A remote-support tool is how the IT provider fixes a laptop without driving over. The customer sees a small agent on each machine. The server that agent talks to lives at the provider, with the provider’s logins, and its upkeep sits with the provider. Patching it feels like the provider’s housekeeping, as remote from the customer as the provider’s office printer.

Sometimes the provider is not even an IT company. CISA’s advisory tells customers to check whether they run SimpleHelp directly or embedded in third-party software. In the case CISA describes, the victims were the customers of a utility billing software provider, and CISA does not say whether that provider’s product shipped the tool.

what happened

The flaws and the fix. On 6 January 2025 the research firm Horizon3.ai reported three vulnerabilities in SimpleHelp, a remote monitoring and management (RMM) product, according to the disclosure timeline in its post of 13 January 2025. SimpleHelp released fixed versions on 8 January 2025. Horizon3 describes what the flaws allow:

  • CVE-2024-57727. Anyone who can reach the server, without logging in, can download files from it, including the configuration file that holds hashed passwords for the admin and technician accounts.
  • CVE-2024-57726. A low-level technician account can promote itself to admin.
  • CVE-2024-57728. An admin can upload a file that runs code on the server.

An admin on the server can reach the customer machines connected to it, and those set up for unattended access. SimpleHelp’s own advisory lists version 5.5.7 and earlier as vulnerable and asks customers to upgrade “as soon as possible”. CISA added CVE-2024-57727 to its catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilities on 13 February 2025.

An MSP’s server turned on its clients. Sophos, in vendor research published on 27 May 2025, described an incident at a managed service provider it does not name. Attackers got into the MSP’s own SimpleHelp server and pushed a SimpleHelp installer through it to the MSP’s clients. Through the same server they collected device names and configurations, users and network connections across several customer networks. They then deployed DragonForce ransomware and took data. Sophos writes that the MSP and the clients outside its monitoring service were hit by both encryption and data theft, and that one client’s endpoint protection and monitoring stopped the attack on its network. Sophos says it has “medium confidence” that the attackers used a chain of the three flaws disclosed in January.

A software vendor’s customers. On 12 June 2025 CISA published advisory AA25-163A. It says ransomware actors likely used CVE-2024-57727 to reach unpatched SimpleHelp servers and compromise the downstream customers of a utility billing software provider, for double extortion. CISA describes this as part of a pattern of ransomware attacks on unpatched SimpleHelp since January 2025.

What nobody has published:

  • the name of the MSP, the billing software provider or any customer;
  • how many customers were affected in either case;
  • whether the two cases are linked. CISA’s advisory cites the Sophos report in a footnote, but its text does not attribute the billing provider case to DragonForce;
  • how long each server ran without the January fix.

step by step

  1. 8 January 2025SimpleHelp ships fixesTwo days after a researcher reported flaws in version 5.5.7 and earlier, fixed releases are out.
  2. 13 February 2025CISA lists the flaw as exploitedCVE-2024-57727 goes into CISA's catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilities.
  3. May 2025an MSP's own server delivers ransomwareSophos reports attackers pushing an installer through an MSP's SimpleHelp server to its clients.the assumption breaks here
  4. 12 June 2025CISA warns about a billing software providerIts customers were compromised through unpatched SimpleHelp, part of a pattern since January 2025.

how it surfaced

In the Sophos case the alarm came from a customer’s side. Sophos’s monitoring flagged a suspicious installation of a SimpleHelp installer file on a client network, and the MSP then brought in Sophos for forensics. The installer came from the provider’s own legitimate server, which is what makes this route hard to see. To the customer’s machines it looked like their provider doing its job.

CISA has not said how the billing provider’s case was found. Its advisory tells software vendors running 5.5.7 or earlier since January 2025 to cut the server off from the internet or stop it, upgrade, and contact their downstream customers so those customers can secure their machines and look for signs of intrusion. It tells customers to look for the SimpleHelp service on their own machines and read which servers it is registered to.

The Kaseya VSA incident of 2021 used a zero-day in a provider tool. Here the fix existed for months, and the open door was a provider’s server that had not taken it. The IT provider guide covers the other doors a provider holds into a company, and blast radius covers how to count what one server can reach.

A provider’s remote-support server reaches every machine that answers to it, so its patch date is part of your security.

You cannot patch it yourself, but you can find out it exists and ask when it was last updated.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour IT provider fixes laptops through a remote-support tool, and every machine quietly checks in to a server the provider runs.
the gap nobody seesNobody at your firm knows which version that server runs, or that a fix for it has been waiting since the start of the year.trusting what a supplier ships
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersAn attacker gets into the server and sends what looks like a routine install to every machine that answers.
    what it costs youYour files are locked and copied out, and the route in was a box you never owned and never saw.
  2. or it goes like this
    howA genuine, signed update from a certified vendor carries a backdoor.
    what leavesa quiet way into your networkwho ends up with ita state intelligence service
    it happenedSolarWinds / Sunburst, 2020
  3. or it goes like this
    howA build helper everyone uses is hijacked and its versions repointed.
    what leavessecret keys, printed into build logswho ends up with itanyone reading public logs
    it happenedtj-actions/changed-files, 2025

sources

  1. CISA: Ransomware Actors Exploit Unpatched SimpleHelp Remote Monitoring and Management to Compromise Utility Billing Software Provider (AA25-163A), 12 June 2025
  2. SimpleHelp: Security Vulnerabilities 01-2025 (vendor advisory, updated 12 February 2025)
  3. Horizon3.ai: Critical Vulnerabilities in SimpleHelp Remote Support Software, 13 January 2025 (researcher disclosure)
  4. Sophos: DragonForce actors target SimpleHelp vulnerabilities to attack MSP, customers, 27 May 2025 (vendor research)
  5. Help Net Security: Attackers hit MSP, use its RMM software to deliver ransomware to clients, 28 May 2025

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Find the remote-support servers your company's machines check in to.

    On a few laptops and servers, look for a folder named "JWrapper-Remote Access" (on Windows under %APPDATA%, on Mac under /Library/Application Support, on Linux under /opt), the location CISA's advisory of 12 June 2025 gives for the SimpleHelp service. If it is there, open serviceconfig.xml in its JWAppsSharedConfig folder and note every server address on a line starting with "ConnectTo". Do the same for any other remote-support agent you find. Then ask each provider and software vendor behind those addresses which version their server runs and when they last patched it, and remove any agent that points to a provider you no longer use. Whose server can reach your machines tonight?

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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