in this guide
  1. the doors a provider holds
  2. who at the provider is actually inside
  3. the contract ends, the access does not
  4. when the provider is the target
  5. what to ask your provider for

Picture a 90-person accounting firm that has never had its own IT department. A local managed service provider set up Microsoft 365 six years ago, installed a remote-management agent on every laptop, and keeps an admin login for “emergencies”. This year the firm moves to a cheaper provider. The handover is a spreadsheet of licences and a goodbye call.

Nobody at the firm can say which of the old provider’s staff can still sign in as an administrator. The firm never knew who they were in the first place.

That is the mechanism in this guide. An outsourced IT provider holds the highest access in your company, through several separate doors, and the people behind those doors are chosen by the provider. Ending the contract closes none of the doors by itself.

You approved the provider. The provider chose who gets in.

This sits next to the contractor guide, which is about individual people who keep their accounts after an engagement ends. A provider is different: an organisation with its own staff turnover, its own tools and its own attackers, holding admin rights in your tenant. It is also different from the support screen, where a software vendor’s agents look at their own customers’ data.

On the record, Red Hat Consulting, 2025 shows clients left guessing what a consultancy’s server held of theirs.

the doors a provider holds

Most firms think of “the IT company” as one relationship. In the admin consoles it shows up as several unrelated grants, each switched off in a different place.

the ways an IT provider is inside your company

  • delegated admin in Microsoft 365granted to the provider's tenant, invisible in your user list
  • Azure subscription ownerassigned when the provider set the subscription up
  • reseller access to Google Workspaceon for every reseller you buy from
  • remote-management agentinstalled on every laptop and server
  • admin accounts inside your tenantoften shared, often named "admin" or after the provider
  • your own named adminsthe people you can see and offboard

often still open after the contract endsusually handled

Delegated admin in Microsoft 365. Under the older model, delegated admin privileges (DAP), Microsoft’s documentation says the provider’s “Admin Agents” group is assigned the Global administrator role in your tenant, and its “Helpdesk Agents” group the Helpdesk administrator role. Those people sign in with their own provider accounts. They never appear as users in your directory, and Microsoft’s documentation says you cannot find these partner role assignments through the Entra admin center, PowerShell or Graph. The only place they show is Settings, then Partner relationships, in the Microsoft 365 admin center.

The granular version. Granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) replaced DAP for new relationships. Your Global admin approves a list of roles, and Microsoft’s GDAP documentation describes the access as least-privileged and time-bound. Time-bound has limits worth knowing. The same documentation says a GDAP relationship lasts at most two years, that the provider can switch on auto extend so it renews by six months at a time until someone ends it, and that your consent is not required to switch auto extend on for an existing relationship. Relationships that include Global Administrator cannot auto extend.

Azure. Microsoft’s documentation adds a detail that catches people out. When a provider creates an Azure subscription for you, its admin group is made Owner of that subscription automatically. Removing delegated admin in the Microsoft 365 admin center does not remove that Owner role. It has to be removed on the subscription itself.

Google Workspace resellers. Google’s help pages say a reseller with Admin console access can manage users, groups, organisational units and devices. If you buy from more than one reseller, all of them get that access unless a super admin turns it off. The switch covers all resellers at once.

The remote-management agent. Remote monitoring and management (RMM) software is how a provider patches, scripts and remotes into your machines. It runs with high privileges on every device it is installed on. Its admin console sits at the provider, protected by the provider’s logins.

Admin accounts inside your tenant. Many providers also create a named or shared admin account in your Microsoft 365 or Google tenant, in the firewall, the backup console and the accounting software. These live in the provider’s password vault. Your offboarding checklist never sees them, because nobody at your firm ever used them.

who at the provider is actually inside

When you approve a GDAP request, you approve a list of roles. Which people fill them is decided at the provider. Microsoft’s documentation describes how it works on the provider’s side: the provider puts its own staff into security groups in its own tenant, and assigns those groups to the roles you approved. The same FAQ notes that a provider can put all of its staff in one group that manages all of its customers.

So the answer to “who can administer our tenant” depends on decisions made inside another company:

  • Who the provider hires and lets go. A technician who leaves the provider is offboarded by the provider, if the provider does it.
  • How the provider protects its own logins. Your Conditional Access and MFA settings protect your users. The provider’s accounts authenticate in the provider’s tenant.
  • Whether the provider shares admin credentials. CISA’s 2022 joint advisory on managed service providers says contracts should specify that providers will not reuse admin credentials across customers.

The control sits outside your company, however careful the provider is, and the only signal you get is whether things still work.

the contract ends, the access does not

Switching providers is where this goes wrong most quietly. The new provider requests its own access. The old provider’s access is a separate set of grants, and ending the contract switches none of them off.

what happens to provider access when you switch

  1. 1notice givenThe contract ends on a date in an email thread.
  2. 2new provider onboardedNew delegated admin, new agent, new admin account.
  3. 3old grants stayDelegated admin, Azure owner, old agent and vault logins are still live.
  4. 4someone uses oneAn ex-technician, or an attacker inside the old provider.

CISA’s 2022 advisory, written with the NSA, the FBI and the cyber agencies of the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, names this directly: “disabling MSP accounts can be overlooked when a contract terminates.” Microsoft’s GDAP documentation adds the commercial side. Removing a provider’s admin relationships does not end its reseller relationship, so the provider can still buy licences for you after you have taken away its admin roles. In the other direction, the roles last until someone removes them or they expire, whatever happens to the invoices.

Two more ways a provider stays in after the end:

  • An old agent nobody removed. A remote-management agent left on a laptop keeps checking in to a console you no longer pay for.
  • The admin account the provider created. It still works, and the password is in a vault you never had access to.

when the provider is the target

A provider with admin rights in dozens of tenants is worth more to an attacker than any one of its customers. Three documented cases show the route.

Nobelium, 2021. In October 2021 Microsoft reported that the group it calls Nobelium was going after cloud service providers, managed service providers and other IT services firms to reach their customers through delegated admin privileges. Microsoft said it had notified more than 140 resellers and technology service providers targeted since May 2021, and that as many as 14 had been compromised. Its advice to customers was to review partner relationships, remove any that look unfamiliar, and avoid shared administrator accounts.

Kaseya VSA, 2021. In July 2021 a ransomware group used a flaw in Kaseya’s on-premises remote-management product to push ransomware through managed service providers to their customers. Kaseya put the count at fewer than 60 of its own customers and fewer than 1,500 downstream businesses, as reported by The Record on 6 July 2021. The Kaseya incident has the details.

SimpleHelp, 2025. In June 2025 CISA reported that ransomware actors had used unpatched SimpleHelp remote-management servers, versions 5.5.7 and earlier, to reach the downstream customers of a utility billing software provider. CISA says the actors “likely” used one specific vulnerability, and describes it as part of a wider pattern of attacks on unpatched SimpleHelp since January 2025.

The common thread is reach. The customers in these cases did not need to make a mistake. Their exposure was set by what their provider’s tools and accounts could touch, which is their blast radius measured from outside the company.

CISA’s 2023 advisory on remote-management software adds why this is hard to spot from your side: legitimate RMM software generally does not trigger antivirus, so an attacker using it looks like your provider doing its job.

what to ask your provider for

CISA’s 2022 advisory recommends that customers put specific controls into their contracts with providers. In plain terms:

  1. MFA on every provider account that can reach your environment.
  2. Provider accounts limited to the systems the provider actually manages, kept out of your internal admin groups.
  3. Audits of how provider accounts are used, and accounts switched off when they are not needed.
  4. Notice of any confirmed or suspected security incident at the provider that could affect you.
  5. No admin credentials reused across customers, written into the agreement.

Then the parts that are yours to run, whatever the contract says:

  • Get a named list of the provider’s tools with access to your systems, including which remote-management product, and who patches it.
  • Ask for GDAP roles sized to the work. Most day-to-day jobs do not need Global Administrator. When one does, ask for it for a limited time.
  • Decide on auto extend yourself. If the relationship renews every six months, someone at your firm should know that and have a reason to keep it.
  • Keep one admin of your own. If the provider is the only party who can administer your tenant, you cannot remove the provider. The break-glass guide covers how to keep an emergency admin account of your own without it becoming a risk.
  • Write the exit down at the start. List every grant the provider will receive, so the same list can be used to remove them.

The shorter version of the same mechanism is in the delegated admin explainer, and the console that can wipe every laptop is covered in the device console guide.

If your provider’s own login was stolen tonight, which of your systems could the attacker reach by morning?

on the record

all myths →
read next in the peopleA14 the bank change nobody approvesan employee is allowed to change where their own pay goes. so is anyone who signs in as them, or emails HR from their mailbox, and the first alarm is an empty account on payday.

sources

  1. Microsoft Learn: obtain a customer's admin privileges (delegated admin and the Partner relationships page)
  2. Microsoft Learn: granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) introduction
  3. Microsoft Learn: GDAP frequently asked questions
  4. Microsoft Learn: customer approval of partner GDAP request
  5. Google Workspace Admin Help: reseller access to your Admin console
  6. Google Workspace Admin Help: change a reseller's access to your Admin console
  7. Microsoft Threat Intelligence: NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks (25 October 2021)
  8. Microsoft On the Issues: new activity from Russian actor Nobelium (24 October 2021)
  9. CISA and partners: protecting against cyber threats to managed service providers and their customers (AA22-131A, May 2022)
  10. CISA, NSA and MS-ISAC: protecting against malicious use of remote monitoring and management software (AA23-025A, January 2023)
  11. CISA: ransomware actors exploit unpatched SimpleHelp remote monitoring and management to compromise utility billing software provider (AA25-163A, June 2025)
  12. The Record: Kaseya says fewer than 1,500 downstream businesses impacted by ransomware attack (6 July 2021)