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delegated admin access

You approve a company, and the company decides which of its people get in. Why partner admin rights never show in your user list, and why they stay after the contract ends.

in one lineDelegated admin access is when your tenant grants admin roles to another organisation, whose own staff then sign in with their own accounts to administer your systems.

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1what it is

Many small companies have an outside party with admin rights in their core tenant: the IT provider that set up Microsoft 365, or the reseller that sold the Google Workspace licences. That access is usually granted to the company as a whole. Your tenant trusts the partner's tenant, and the partner chooses which of its staff can use the trust.

In Microsoft 365 this comes in two forms. Under the older delegated admin privileges (DAP), Microsoft's documentation says the partner's Admin Agents group is assigned the Global administrator role in your tenant and its Helpdesk Agents group the Helpdesk administrator role. Its people sign in with their own partner credentials. Granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) replaced it for new relationships: your Global admin approves a list of roles, and each relationship has an end date.

Google Workspace has its own version. Google's help pages say a reseller with Admin console access can manage your users, groups, organisational units and devices, and that if you buy from several resellers, all of them get that access unless a super admin turns it off.

2why it accumulates

It is invisible where you look. Partner staff are not users in your directory, so they never show up in a user export, a licence count or an offboarding checklist. Microsoft's documentation says customers cannot find partners holding a directory role through the Entra admin center, PowerShell or Graph. The only place they show is the Partner relationships page.

The people behind it change without you. Microsoft's GDAP FAQ says a partner can put all of its users into one security group that manages all of its customers. When a technician joins or leaves the provider, your exposure changes, and nobody tells you.

The end date can move. Microsoft's GDAP FAQ puts the maximum length of a relationship at two years, and lets it auto extend by six months at a time until someone ends it. The same FAQ says customer consent is not required to switch auto extend on for an existing relationship. Relationships that include Global Administrator cannot auto extend. Microsoft's DAP page describes no expiry, only removal by the customer.

Ending the contract changes nothing. Removing delegated admin is a separate act from ending the commercial relationship, in both directions. Microsoft says removing GDAP does not end the reseller relationship. CISA's joint advisory of May 2022 on managed service providers puts the other half plainly: "disabling MSP accounts can be overlooked when a contract terminates." Microsoft adds one more trap: when a partner creates an Azure subscription for you, its admin group becomes Owner of it, and removing delegated admin in the Microsoft 365 admin center leaves that role in place.

3what it costs you

A partner with admin rights in many tenants is a single target that opens all of them. In October 2021 Microsoft reported that the group it calls Nobelium was going after cloud and IT service providers to reach their customers through delegated admin privileges. Microsoft said it had notified more than 140 resellers and technology service providers targeted since May 2021, and believed as many as 14 had been compromised.

The cost does not depend on a mistake inside your company. Your exposure is set by the partner's hiring, its offboarding and how it protects its own sign-ins. Partner staff authenticate in the partner's tenant, and Microsoft's documentation says a Conditional Access policy reaches them when it targets the "Service provider users" type. The same reach through a provider's tools shows in the SimpleHelp incident of 2025, where ransomware arrived at customers through their provider's own remote-support server.

There is also a quieter cost: when something changes in your tenant, the log shows an action by a partner. Which person at the partner did it is a question only the partner can answer.

what it looks like when it goes wrong

Three ways this tends to go, each one taken from a real case.

your company
the gap nobody seesThe people who can administer your tenant through a partner never appear in your list of users.a connected app with standing access
  1. howA chat tool's key into your CRM is stolen from the vendor.
    what leavessupport tickets, including passwords pasted into themwho ends up with itan extortion group working through hundreds of companies
    it happenedSalesloft / Drift, 2025
  2. howIntegration keys to your code host are stolen from the integration vendor.
    what leavesyour private code and the secrets inside itwho ends up with itattackers looking for the next door
    it happenedGitHub OAuth tokens, 2022
  3. howAn analytics vendor is breached and the keys it holds to your systems are copied.
    what leavesconnections straight into your datawho ends up with itwhoever holds the vendor's keys
    it happenedSisense, 2024

4what works

The fix is mostly an inventory, and it fits in an afternoon.

  1. List every partner. In the Microsoft 365 admin center, open Settings, then Partner relationships, and note each partner and the roles it holds. In Google Workspace, a super admin can check Account, then Reseller management. The Google switch covers all resellers at once.
  2. Check Azure separately. In each subscription, look for an Owner role held by a partner group, and remove it if the partner no longer manages the subscription.
  3. Remove what has outlived its reason. Any partner you no longer work with loses its roles. Before removing the one partner that runs your tenant, make sure you hold an admin account of your own. The last admin guide covers what else leaves with them.
  4. Size what stays. Ask the current provider for GDAP roles that match the work, with Global Administrator only where a task needs it, and decide yourself whether auto extend should be on.
  5. Ask about the people. CISA's 2022 advisory tells customers to require MFA on every provider account that reaches their environment, keep those accounts out of internal admin groups, and audit how they are used.

The full set of doors a provider holds, including remote-management agents and the admin accounts it creates inside your tools, is in the IT provider guide. Individual outside people with their own accounts are covered in the contractor guide and the contractor access explainer.

Which partner on that list would you still recognise by name?

on the record

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your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Open Partner relationships in the Microsoft 365 admin center, or Reseller management in Google Workspace, and list every partner with admin access.

    Any partner you no longer work with should lose its roles this week. Keep one admin account of your own before you remove anything.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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