mythsthe peopleRed Hat Consulting2025IT consulting / united states

everyone assumed:

what we hand a consultant stays inside the project

what was actually true:

In October 2025 Red Hat confirmed that an outsider copied data from the GitLab server its consultants used for client work, and clients could only guess what of theirs had been in it.

how it happened

  1. whoan intruderhow they got in is not public
  2. the gapthe consultancy's project serverself-managed, held client engagement material
  3. thenclient materialRed Hat: specs, code snippets, contacts; attackers claim tokens
  4. the resultclients told to rotateBelgium's CCB: revoke what was shared
the gap that let it happen the result

what everyone assumed

No Red Hat client has published what it believed, so this belief is an inference from how consulting work is done. A client hires a consultancy for a project, shares what the project needs, and thinks of that material as part of the project: scoped to it, finished with it, and protected by a firm whose business is infrastructure. That is a reasonable view. The consultants are vetted, the contract has confidentiality clauses, and the firm in this case is one of the best-known names in enterprise Linux.

What the view leaves out is where the material physically goes. Consultants work in their own tools. Whatever a client sends them, from an architecture diagram to a connection string, can end up in the consultancy’s repository server, under the consultancy’s accounts and the consultancy’s patching.

what happened

Red Hat’s statement of 2 October 2025, also posted on its Customer Portal and last updated there on 3 October, is the primary record. It says Red Hat detected unauthorised access to a GitLab instance used for internal Red Hat Consulting collaboration in select engagements, and that an unauthorised third party had “accessed and copied some data from this instance”. Red Hat says it removed the access, isolated the instance, contacted the authorities and added hardening. It says the data may include project specifications, example code snippets, internal communications about consulting services and limited business contact information. It says it has no reason to believe other Red Hat services, products or its software supply chain are affected, and that it will contact consulting customers directly if it believes they were affected.

Red Hat’s statement does not say how the intruder got in, when the access started, when it was detected, or how many clients were involved. It does not mention tokens, passwords or keys either way, and gives clients no rotation advice. GitLab told BleepingComputer that its own managed systems were not breached and that the instance was Red Hat’s self-managed GitLab Community Edition, whose security is the customer’s responsibility. As reported by BleepingComputer, Red Hat said its customer engagement reports typically do not contain personal information.

Everything about scale and content comes from the attackers, and Red Hat has not confirmed any of it:

  • The size. A group calling itself Crimson Collective claimed, as reported by BleepingComputer on 2 October 2025, to have taken about 570 GB of compressed data from about 28,000 internal repositories, including about 800 customer engagement reports. These are the attackers’ figures.
  • The secrets. The same group claimed it found authentication tokens and full database connection strings in code and in those reports, and used them to reach client infrastructure. BleepingComputer and The Register report this as a claim, and no client has confirmed it publicly.
  • The leak. On 6 October 2025 BleepingComputer reported that samples the attackers say are client reports had appeared on a leak site run by a second group, ShinyHunters, with publication threatened for 10 October. BleepingComputer does not say it verified the samples, and Red Hat did not respond to it on this.

step by step

  1. clients share project material with consultantsSpecifications, code and configuration go into a repository server the consultancy runs.
  2. an outsider copies data from that serverRed Hat confirmed the access and the copying on 2 October 2025; the attackers say it began in September.the assumption breaks here
  3. 2 October 2025Belgium's national cyber centre rates it high riskIt tells organisations to revoke and rotate tokens, keys and credentials shared with Red Hat.
  4. 6 October 2025samples appear on a leak siteThe attackers post what they say are client reports and set a deadline of 10 October; the samples have not been publicly verified.

how it surfaced

The attackers went public first, and Red Hat confirmed the incident on 2 October 2025. The same day, the Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium put out a warning that rated the incident “high risk” for Belgian organisations that used Red Hat Consulting or shared credentials, tokens or network data with Red Hat. The warning says the reports may include network information, authentication tokens and keys, and configuration data, and it labels the use of stolen tokens as the attackers’ claim. It also points at the indirect route: organisations whose IT providers or partners worked with Red Hat Consulting may be exposed too. Its first recommended action is to revoke and rotate all tokens, keys and credentials shared with Red Hat or used in integrations.

That advice is the cost this page can document. No client has said what it lost, and no count of affected clients is public. A client that had sent secrets into a consulting project had no way to check from the outside whether they were in the copied data, so the safe answer was to treat them all as exposed.

The closest case on this site is Sisense in 2024, where a vendor’s own GitLab led to credentials it held for customers, and customers were told to reset everything. For the access an outside IT firm keeps inside your systems, see the IT provider guide. This case is the other direction: what you gave them, sitting in theirs. A token you hand over keeps working until you change it, which is the whole argument of the token that lives forever.

A secret you send a consultant lives in the consultant’s systems until you change it.

Which keys has your company sent to an outside firm, and which of them still work today?

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour company hires a consultancy to help move a database, and your engineer sends them the connection details so they can start on day one.
the gap nobody seesThose details now also sit in the consultancy's project files, behind their logins and their patching, where nobody at your company can see them.a connected app with standing access
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersThe consultancy is breached and someone copies its project files.
    what it costs youYou learn about it from the news and have to work out which keys you ever handed over, then change them all in a hurry.
  2. or it goes like this
    howA chat tool's key into your CRM is stolen from the vendor.
    what leavessupport tickets, including passwords pasted into themwho ends up with itan extortion group working through hundreds of companies
    it happenedSalesloft / Drift, 2025
  3. or it goes like this
    howIntegration keys to your code host are stolen from the integration vendor.
    what leavesyour private code and the secrets inside itwho ends up with itattackers looking for the next door
    it happenedGitHub OAuth tokens, 2022

sources

  1. Red Hat: Security update, incident related to Red Hat Consulting GitLab instance (2 October 2025)
  2. Red Hat Customer Portal: Security update, incident related to Red Hat Consulting GitLab instance (updated 3 October 2025)
  3. Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium: Hackers (The Crimson Collective) use leaked authentication tokens to access customer systems (2 October 2025, updated 3 October 2025)
  4. BleepingComputer: Red Hat confirms security incident after hackers claim GitLab breach (2 October 2025)
  5. BleepingComputer: Red Hat data breach escalates as ShinyHunters joins extortion (6 October 2025)
  6. The Register: Red Hat breach, new claims (7 October 2025)

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    List every credential you have sent to a consultancy or agency, and rotate the ones still live.

    Search your email, tickets and shared folders for database connection strings, API keys, service passwords and VPN profiles sent to outside firms, and ask each firm which of your engagements it still keeps in its own repositories. Rotate anything still working, and write into the next statement of work that project credentials are issued per engagement and revoked when it ends. When Red Hat's consulting GitLab was copied, that list was what Belgian organisations were told to work from.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

the letter · every two weeks

one access gap in your inbox, with the fix.

Every issue takes one way access creeps in, shows a real incident where it went wrong, and ends with one thing to check that week. Written for the people who run the tools, without a security team behind them.

  • 1one mechanism, explained plainly
  • 2one real incident, taken apart
  • 3one step you can take on Monday

get the next issue

One email every two weeks. Your address stays here and is never passed to vendors. One click to unsubscribe. Privacy.