mythsthe wider recordCollins Aerospace2025airport software / europe

everyone assumed:

each airport's check-in desks run on that airport's own system

what was actually true:

Airlines at Heathrow, Brussels, Berlin and Dublin checked passengers in through the same Collins Aerospace software, so ransomware at the vendor sent all of them back to manual check-in in the same weekend of September 2025.

how it happened

  1. whoan attackerhow they got in is unknown
  2. the gapone shared platformMUSE runs common-use check-in for many airlines
  3. thenmanual check-inHeathrow, Brussels, Berlin, Dublin
  4. the resultflights cancelledrecovery waits for a clean version from the vendor
the gap that let it happen the result

what everyone assumed

An airport looks like a place that runs its own systems. The desks, the gates and the bag belts are in its terminals, and each airport signs its own contracts. A passenger in Brussels and a passenger at Heathrow seem to depend on two different setups. That is a reasonable reading of what is visible. Behind the desks, though, many airports buy the same common-use passenger processing software, so dozens of airlines can share one row of desks. Collins Aerospace, part of RTX, sells one such product, MUSE. In a release of 9 April 2025, RTX said its cMUSE system served more than 80 airlines at Heathrow and called Heathrow its largest site of this kind.

what happened

How the attacker got in is unknown. No primary source opened for this page says, and this page does not guess.

What RTX states is narrow. In a Form 8-K filed on 24 September 2025, the company said it became aware on 19 September of a “product cybersecurity incident involving ransomware” on systems that support MUSE. The filing describes MUSE as software that lets multiple airlines share check-in and gate resources at airports, including baggage handling. It adds that the MUSE airport systems run outside the RTX enterprise network, on customer-specific networks. The filing does not explain how one incident reached several customers’ sites at once. It says customers moved to back-up or manual processes, with some delays and cancellations, and that RTX did not expect a material impact on the company.

The airports’ side came through their own statements, as reported by the Associated Press on 20 and 21 September 2025:

  • Brussels Airport said a cyberattack hit its check-in and boarding service provider on the night of Friday 19 September. It cancelled 25 departures on Saturday and 50 on Sunday, and asked airlines to cancel half of the 276 departures planned for Monday, because Collins Aerospace “is not yet able to deliver a new secure version of the check-in system”. It kept 85% of weekend departures with extra staff, self bag drop and online check-in.
  • Berlin Brandenburg said operators had cut connections to the affected systems, and its website warned of longer waits because of an outage at a service provider.
  • Heathrow called the disruption minimal on Saturday and said on Sunday that work continued to recover from the outage of a Collins Aerospace airline system.
  • Collins Aerospace said the impact was limited to electronic check-in and baggage drop, and could be handled with manual check-in.

The Record reported on 22 September that Dublin Airport said some airlines were still issuing boarding passes and bag tags by hand.

The rest comes from reporting and claims, and nothing below is confirmed by RTX or the authorities:

  • The malware. SecurityWeek reported on 24 September 2025 that researchers believe a ransomware strain called HardBit was involved. It also relayed a BBC report that Collins found attackers still in the network after rebuilding systems, with perhaps more than a thousand computers affected. The BBC worded that as a possibility.
  • The claim of access. heise online reported on 26 October 2025 that the Everest group claimed it reached a Collins file server on 10 September with simple credentials, and denied using ransomware. Hudson Rock, a security vendor, said in its own research reported by heise that those credentials came from an employee machine infected in 2022. Neither claim has been confirmed by Collins.

step by step

  1. airlines share desks through one vendor's softwareMUSE lets many airlines use the same check-in desks, gates and bag drops at an airport.
  2. 19 September 2025ransomware hits the systems that support MUSERTX later told the SEC it became aware of the incident that day.the assumption breaks here
  3. 20 to 22 September 2025several airports go manual at onceHeathrow, Brussels, Berlin and Dublin report delays; Brussels cancels departures and waits for a secure version from Collins.
  4. 22 to 24 September 2025ransomware confirmed, a suspect arrestedENISA calls it a third-party ransomware incident; RTX files an 8-K; the NCA arrests a man in West Sussex on suspicion of Computer Misuse Act offences.

how it surfaced

RTX says it became aware on 19 September; the public saw it on Saturday 20 September 2025, in queues at the desks. The UK’s NCSC said that day it was working with Collins Aerospace, affected UK airports, the Department for Transport and law enforcement. On 22 September ENISA, the EU cybersecurity agency, told reporters the disruption came from a “third-party ransomware incident”, and said it knew the type of ransomware without naming it, according to The Record and Bloomberg. On 24 September the National Crime Agency said it had arrested a man in his forties in West Sussex on suspicion of Computer Misuse Act offences and released him on conditional bail, adding that the investigation was at an early stage. The NCA statement does not name him or link him to any group.

The cost is clearest at Brussels: by the airport’s own figures as reported by AP, it cancelled departures on Saturday and Sunday and asked airlines to drop half of Monday’s, and it could not switch back until the vendor delivered a version it trusted. The pattern is older than this case. Attackers used Kaseya VSA to push ransomware to many companies through one tool, CrowdStrike stopped many companies with one update, and CDK Global left thousands of car dealers on paper.

When many companies share one supplier’s platform, they also share its worst day, and the supplier decides when it ends.

The guide on your IT provider’s access covers what one provider can reach across its customers, and blast radius covers how to count what one account can reach.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour front desk, your bookings and your invoicing all run on one supplier's software, the same one most firms in your trade use.
the gap nobody seesNobody has asked which parts of that software are shared across the supplier's customers, or how you would work for a few days without it.one system with no plan B
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersThe supplier is hit, and every firm on its platform loses the same screens on the same morning, yours included.
    what it costs youYou work by hand while you wait, and the date you get back to normal is set by the supplier.
  2. or it goes like this
    howYour main software vendor is hit and goes dark for two weeks.
    what leavessales, orders and invoicingwho ends up with itcompetitors, as customers go elsewhere
    it happenedCDK Global, 2024
  3. or it goes like this
    howBackups live where the attacker can delete them too.
    what leaveseverything, with nothing left to restorewho ends up with itthe business itself, which closes
    it happenedCode Spaces, 2014

sources

  1. RTX Corporation, Form 8-K, Item 8.01, event date 19 September 2025, filed 24 September 2025 (SEC filing)
  2. RTX: Heathrow AOC and RTX's Collins Aerospace ink contract extension to provide streamlined passenger processing, 9 April 2025
  3. NCSC: NCSC statement: Incident impacting Collins Aerospace, 20 September 2025
  4. National Crime Agency: UK arrest following aerospace cyber incident, 24 September 2025
  5. AP via Anchorage Daily News: Cyberattack disrupts check-in systems at major European airports, 20 September 2025
  6. AP via NBC News: Airport cyberattack disrupts more flights across Europe, 21 September 2025
  7. The Record: Ransomware attack behind airport check-in delays across Europe, EU agency says, 22 September 2025
  8. Bloomberg via Claims Journal: Ransomware Hack Caused European Airport Delays, Canceled Flights, 22 September 2025
  9. SecurityWeek: European Airport Cyberattack Linked to Obscure Ransomware, Suspect Arrested, 24 September 2025
  10. heise online: Collins Aerospace: Old Passwords and Delayed Response Enable Data Theft, 26 October 2025

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Ask your most important software supplier how it would hand you a clean system after an attack, and write down the answer.

    Pick the one supplier whose screens your front line cannot work without. Ask which parts of its service are shared with its other customers, who decides that a rebuilt version is safe, and how it would get that version to you. Brussels Airport spent days waiting for exactly that in September 2025. While you wait for the reply, run one hour of a normal day on your manual fallback, and see which step nobody remembers how to do.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

the letter · every two weeks

one access gap in your inbox, with the fix.

Every issue takes one way access creeps in, shows a real incident where it went wrong, and ends with one thing to check that week. Written for the people who run the tools, without a security team behind them.

  • 1one mechanism, explained plainly
  • 2one real incident, taken apart
  • 3one step you can take on Monday

get the next issue

One email every two weeks. Your address stays here and is never passed to vendors. One click to unsubscribe. Privacy.