in this guide
Every employee can change the bank account their salary goes to. That is a sensible design: it is their money, and nobody wants HR typing account numbers from a scanned form. It also means the most valuable field in your HR system has one owner and no approver. Whoever can act as that employee, in the HR portal or in their mailbox, can move next month’s pay, and the system records a normal self-service change.
This guide is about that field. It sits between two existing guides and overlaps neither. The helpdesk reset guide is about a caller talking a help desk into handing over an account. The payment approval guide is about money going out to suppliers, where a second person approves and checks the same screen as the first. Payroll redirect needs no help desk and fools no approver, because the change is made by, or on behalf of, the one person allowed to make it.
two doors to the same field
The record shows two ways in, sometimes used by the same attacker.
two ways to change where someone's pay goes
the inbox door
HR makes the change for the employee
- An email from the employee's own mailbox asks to update direct deposit
- Someone in payroll edits the record on their behalf
- HR's reply lands in a folder the employee never sees
the portal door
the attacker makes the change as the employee
- A phished session signs in to the HR portal, often through SSO
- The bank details are edited in self-service
- The confirmation email is deleted by a rule before anyone reads it
The inbox door. In September 2019 the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) described HR and payroll staff receiving emails that appeared to come from employees asking to update their direct deposit details. The same alert counted 1,053 complaints about this version of payroll diversion between January 2018 and June 2019, with $8,323,354 in reported losses and an average of $7,904 per complaint. The new account, the FBI said, generally led to a prepaid card.
The portal door. The FBI’s first payroll alert, in September 2018, described the other route: phishing emails capture an employee’s login, the criminal signs in to the payroll account, changes the bank details and adds rules so the employee gets no alerts. In April 2025 the FBI added search engine ads that point to lookalike employee self-service sites, where the stolen login is used to change direct deposit and redirect future payments.
Microsoft’s incident responders, in vendor research published on 9 April 2026, describe an actor it calls Storm-2755 using both doors against employees in Canada. After phishing a Microsoft 365 session, it searched for payroll and HR contacts and emailed them with the subject “Question about direct deposit”. Where that did not work, it signed in to Workday as the victim and changed the bank details itself.
what the portal login really protects
Picture a 150-person company that put its HR platform behind single sign-on two years ago. It felt like a security upgrade, and in most ways it was. It also means the HR portal is exactly as strong as the email login, and anyone holding a valid email session walks into payroll without a second question.
That is the path Microsoft documented on 9 October 2025 in vendor research on an actor it tracks as Storm-2657, which targeted US universities:
how a phished email session became a redirected salary
- 1phishing pageA relay page captures the password and the MFA code. Some accounts had no MFA at all.
- 2email, then SSOThe stolen session opens Exchange Online, and single sign-on opens Workday.
- 3a phone of their ownThe attacker registers their own phone number as an MFA device on the account.
- 4payment election changedThe salary destination is switched to an attacker account.
- 5the notice disappearsAn inbox rule deletes the Workday notification emails.
Microsoft counted 11 compromised accounts at three universities since March 2025, and phishing emails sent to nearly 6,000 addresses across 25 universities. It also stated that the attacks did not involve any vulnerability in Workday. The weakness was the sign-in in front of it.
Two details matter for any company, whatever its HR system.
The MFA was the kind that can be relayed. A code typed into a page can be typed into the wrong page, and a relay kit passes it on in real time; the Tycoon2FA record shows how commercial those kits have become. The FBI’s April 2025 alert puts it bluntly: “Multi-factor authentication will not protect you if you land on a fraudulent login page.” What gets stolen is the session, which the token guide explains, and which keeps working after the password is changed until someone revokes it. The passkeys guide covers the sign-in methods a relay page cannot use.
The attacker set up their own way back in. Registering a phone as an MFA device means a password reset alone does not end the access. Microsoft’s response steps for Storm-2657 include reviewing and removing recently added MFA devices for exactly this reason.
why the confirmation email does not help
Most HR and payroll systems send an email when bank details change. Every campaign above was built around that email.
- The FBI’s 2018 alert describes criminals adding rules so the employee receives no alerts about the change.
- Microsoft’s 2025 report describes an inbox rule that deleted Workday notification emails, some with names made only of symbols so they were easy to miss in a list.
- Microsoft’s 2026 report describes rules moving any mail containing “direct deposit” or “bank” into a hidden folder.
- The FBI’s April 2025 alert describes a sudden flood of spam used to bury the genuine notice.
A notification sent to the mailbox the attacker controls informs the attacker. The mail layer guide explains, for Google Workspace, why such rules are hard to find from an admin console: a filter is a separate object from the forwarding setting, and creating one raises no alert.
Some payroll vendors have moved the notice out of reach. Checkwriters’ release notes for its employee self-service say a direct deposit change request now triggers an email to every valid address on the employee’s record, personal ones included, and that it goes out even if the employee opted out of email contact. The stated purpose is to let the employee warn the employer before the request is accepted. A personal address or a text to a phone number that was on file before the change is a channel the work mailbox cannot hide.
The alarm has to ring somewhere the attacker is not sitting.
who can change the bank details at your company
Before choosing controls, list every path to the field. In most small companies there are at least three.
- The employee, in self-service. Protected by whatever protects their HR login, which is usually their email login.
- HR or payroll staff, on the employee’s behalf. Protected by whatever HR checks before editing a record. If the answer is “the email came from their address”, the inbox door is open.
- The payroll provider’s own support. Some providers can change details or switch off a verification step when an employee cannot confirm an old account. Ask yours what they check.
Then look for a second check on the field. Some systems have one built in. Oracle’s JD Edwards documentation, for example, describes self-service direct deposit changes that must be reviewed and approved by someone in payroll before the database is updated. ADP’s guidance for its clients recommends reviewing a report of bank account changes with every payroll, alongside new hires and pay rate changes, and using MFA on payroll systems where it is available.
The call-back that the payment approval guide recommends for supplier bank changes helps here too, with one caution: an attacker inside the HR portal can usually edit the employee’s phone number in the same session. Call the number that was on file before the change, or ask the employee in person.
what narrows it
- Phishing-resistant sign-in for the HR portal, or for the identity provider in front of it. This closes the portal door for relay kits, and both Microsoft reports recommend it.
- No bank changes from email. HR points every request to the self-service portal, and never edits bank details because a message asked.
- A notice outside the work mailbox. A text, or an email to a personal address recorded at hiring, for every bank change.
- A review before payday. Every bank change since the last payroll, checked by someone other than the person who processed it, with a call to anyone whose change nobody can vouch for.
- Alerts on the rules. New inbox rules that move or delete mail mentioning payroll, direct deposit or bank, and new MFA devices registered on the same account in the same week. The MFA gaps and session token theft explainers cover the sign-in side.
The IC3’s 2025 annual report counts 24,768 business email compromise complaints and $3,046,598,558 in losses, and does not report payroll diversion separately. The 2019 figures above are the last payroll-only count the FBI has published, so nobody can say from public data how common this is today. The cost to any one employee is easier to state: a missed salary, and an awkward conversation about who pays it back.
If one of your employees phoned on payday to say the salary never arrived, who would find out where it went, and how long would it take them?
sources
- FBI IC3: Cybercriminals Utilize Social Engineering Techniques to Obtain Employee Credentials to Conduct Payroll Diversion (I-091818-PSA, 18 September 2018)
- FBI IC3: Business Email Compromise, the $26 Billion Scam (I-091019-PSA, 10 September 2019)
- FBI IC3: Cyber Criminals Impersonating Employee Self-Service Websites to Steal Victim Information and Funds (I-042425-PSA, 24 April 2025)
- FBI IC3: 2025 Internet Crime Report
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Investigating targeted 'payroll pirate' attacks affecting US universities (9 October 2025)
- Microsoft Security Blog: Investigating Storm-2755, 'payroll pirate' attacks targeting Canadian employees (9 April 2026)
- Checkwriters Help: release notes, employee direct deposit change request notification
- Oracle JD Edwards documentation: understanding automatic deposit information approval
- ADP: protection against payroll fraud
