in this guide
  1. an account nobody is watching
  2. the cover that becomes a shared login
  3. what the console calls a pause
  4. the day they come back
  5. who tells IT

Picture a 120-person firm. The finance lead starts nine months of parental leave in March. HR has the dates, payroll knows, her team has a handover document. Nobody tells IT, because nothing about IT seems to change: she is coming back.

So her account stays exactly as it was. Same groups, same admin role in the accounting tool, same phone registered for MFA, same automations running under her name. To keep invoices moving, a colleague is given her password “for a few weeks”. In June somebody signs in to her mailbox from a new device. Everyone assumes it is the colleague.

That is the mechanism. Identity tools react to two events, a join and a leave. A long leave is neither, so it triggers nothing, and an account with no owner at the keyboard keeps every permission it had for months. The guides on contractors and hostile departures deal with people whose access should end. This one is about the person whose access has to survive, and about the year in between.

what a long leave leaves switched on

  • groups and admin roleseverything from the last working day
  • sessions and app tokensstill valid on the laptop at home
  • automations and connected appsrunning under the absent name
  • the shared passwordhanded to a colleague to cover
  • the MFA phonewhich may be replaced before the return
  • HR recordhas the dates, tells nobody in IT

open while the owner is awayknows the dates

an account nobody is watching

A normal account has one built-in alarm: its owner. A strange sign-in prompt, a sent message they never wrote, a password that suddenly fails. People on leave, by design, are not looking at any of that.

Mandiant documented the extreme version in August 2022. APT29 guessed the password of an account that, in Mandiant’s words, “had been setup, but never used”. Because the account was dormant and had no MFA method registered, Azure AD asked the attacker to enrol one. Once enrolled, the attacker used the account to reach the organisation’s VPN. Mandiant’s recommendation was that every active account should have at least one MFA device enrolled, with extra checks on enrolment.

That was an unused account, and nobody was on leave. The reasoning carries over: an account of someone away for months has the same missing alarm, and if their old MFA method was removed after a phone change, it can sit in the same state.

Microsoft’s own guidance on inactive accounts makes the detection problem visible. It lists vacation as a legitimate reason for no sign-ins and calls a window of 90 to 180 days reasonable for treating an account as inactive. A nine-month leave crosses that line, so a cleanup that relies on last sign-in will either flag the absent person as stale or teach you to ignore the flag.

There is a better signal in the same data. Microsoft records the last interactive sign-in, a person at a login screen, separately from the last non-interactive one, an app or token renewing access in the background. An account whose owner has been away since March, with an interactive sign-in from last week, has a person using it. A recent non-interactive sign-in means something is still running as them. Either one needs a name next to it.

the cover that becomes a shared login

The shared password is the part that feels harmless, because it starts as good teamwork.

It breaks three things at once. Every action in the log now belongs to the absent person, so you can no longer tell the colleague from anyone else holding the password. MFA prompts go to a phone at home, so either the person on leave approves sign-ins they did not make, or someone disables MFA to stop the prompts. And when the leave ends, nobody changes the password, because nobody remembers it was shared.

The products already have the tool for this. In Microsoft 365, an admin can give a colleague Read and manage permission on the mailbox, which Exchange calls Full Access. Microsoft’s documentation is explicit that this permission does not include sending as the person; Send as and Send on behalf are separate grants, so you can decide whether the colleague only reads or also writes. Microsoft notes that permission changes can take up to 60 minutes to apply. An admin can also set the automatic reply on someone’s mailbox from the admin center, without anyone knowing their password.

In Google Workspace, mail delegation lets a delegate read, send and receive on the owner’s behalf. An admin chooses whether a sent message shows both the owner and the delegate who sent it, or the owner only. Delegates are assigned by the user in their own Gmail settings, and Google points admins to the Gmail API to manage them, which is why the mail layer guide finds no list of delegations in the console. Ask for the delegation to be set up on the last working day, while the owner is still at the keyboard.

Delegation outlives its reason just as easily as a password does. The guide on assistants and delegates covers how that happens. For a leave, the fix is simple: write the end date of the delegation into the same place as the return date.

Anything that runs under the absent person’s account, a scheduled flow or a connected app, is covered in the automation owner guide. A leave is the cheapest moment to move it to an owner who is present.

what the console calls a pause

If you decide the account should not be usable while its owner is away, each product offers a switch. They do different things, and some of them do things you did not intend.

two pause buttons, two different results

Microsoft 365: block sign-in

per Microsoft's admin documentation

  • Can take up to 24 hours to take effect
  • Reset the password and sign out of all sessions for an immediate stop
  • Apps connected through automatic provisioning get the user disabled
  • Removing the licence instead deletes mail, contacts and calendar after 30 days

Google Workspace: suspend

per Google's admin help

  • Gmail and Drive become unavailable to the user
  • New email and calendar invitations are blocked
  • Still billed at the same rate as an active account
  • Sign-in cookies reset; third-party app access is revoked separately

Microsoft 365. Microsoft’s offboarding page says blocking sign-in can take up to 24 hours. Its faster route is resetting the password and choosing sign out of all sessions; an access token is good for an hour, so the person is asked to sign in again within that time. Entra’s revocation page adds the limit that matters for a long leave: Entra cannot directly revoke a session that another application issued itself. Those sessions end when the application’s own token expires, or sooner if the disabled state is synced to it. Entra’s provisioning service does that sync: a user who is disabled in Entra is disabled in each app connected through automatic provisioning. Apps outside that connection keep a working local login.

The licence trap. Removing a Microsoft 365 licence looks like a sensible saving for a year away. Microsoft’s own offboarding overview says that after a licence is removed, the person’s email, contacts and calendar are kept for 30 days and then deleted permanently. For someone coming back, that is the wrong switch.

Google Workspace. Google’s help page says suspending a user makes services such as Gmail and Drive unavailable to them, blocks new email and calendar invitations, keeps their data, and keeps charging for the account at the same rate. Collaborators keep their access to shared documents. Google’s sign-out page adds that suspension resets the user’s sign-in cookies, and that access granted to third-party apps is revoked as a separate step. Before you suspend someone whose address customers still write to, test what a sender sees, and arrange forwarding or a delegate first.

Okta and similar identity providers. Okta has two states that sound alike. Suspended users cannot reach their apps, the admin console or their dashboard, and their app and group memberships are kept and reinstated when they are unsuspended. Deactivation removes app assignments and permanently deletes the password. Suspension fits a leave. Deactivation fits a leaver.

None of these switches touches the tokens and grants described in the token guide by itself, and none of them reaches an app that has its own login. For those, the leave needs the same list of systems you would use for a leaver, worked through with a pause in mind.

the day they come back

The return is the second risky day, and it gets less attention than the first.

The phone has changed. Nine months is long enough for a new phone, and the MFA method on the old one is gone. Getting the person back in runs through a recovery path. Microsoft’s Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited code, configurable from 10 minutes to 30 days, that lets the user register a new method, and Microsoft’s page tells users to remove the old one afterwards. Google lets an admin generate a backup code and send it to the user. Google’s page describes no identity check before that step, so the check is yours to add. The passkeys guide and the helpdesk reset guide cover what that call should verify. Use a channel you already have on record, such as the HR phone number.

Unpausing restores the old world. Okta says plainly that a suspended user’s memberships are reinstated on return. That is convenient, and it also means a person who was away during a reorganisation comes back with access to the old team’s systems and the old admin role. Treat the return as a small onboarding: compare what the job needs now with what the account held in March.

Close the cover. Remove the colleague’s delegation or Send as permission. If a password was shared, the owner sets a new one on their first morning back. Check the sign-in log for the leave period while you are there; anything you cannot explain belongs in a conversation before the account is fully back.

One boundary. Reading an absent employee’s mail, contacting someone on parental or sick leave, and recording why they are away are regulated differently from country to country, and some of that data is sensitive. Agree the arrangement with the person before they go, keep it to settings and access, and ask an employment lawyer before you write it into a policy. The mail layer guide has a short note on where the line sits in one European country.

who tells IT

Every fix above depends on one message that does not exist yet: HR telling whoever runs the admin consoles that a leave starts on a date and ends on a date. That message costs nothing. Without it, IT learns about the leave when the colleague with the shared password forgets it.

The decision per person is short. Leave the account on with delegation set up, pause it with the right switch for your product, or something in between for a key holder such as the only admin of a system. Write the choice and the return date where both HR and IT will see them.

Who in your company is on leave right now, and who has been signing in as them?

read next in the peopleA16 who else can read the invoices inboxinfo@, invoices@ and support@ collect supplier bank details and the password resets for a dozen tools. whoever can read that mailbox can take those tools over. can you name everyone who can?

sources

  1. Microsoft Learn: step 1, prevent user sign-in and block access to Microsoft 365
  2. Microsoft Learn: remove a former employee, overview
  3. Microsoft Learn: revoke user access in an emergency in Microsoft Entra ID
  4. Microsoft Learn: how application provisioning works in Microsoft Entra ID
  5. Microsoft Learn: give mailbox permissions to another user
  6. Microsoft Learn: how to set automatic replies on a user's mailbox in Microsoft 365
  7. Microsoft Learn: how to manage inactive user accounts
  8. Microsoft Learn: configure a Temporary Access Pass in Microsoft Entra ID
  9. Google Workspace Admin Help: suspend a user temporarily
  10. Google Workspace Admin Help: sign a user out of a managed Google Account
  11. Google Workspace Admin Help: let users delegate access to a Gmail account
  12. Google Workspace Admin Help: recover an account protected by 2-Step Verification
  13. Okta Help: user account status
  14. Okta Help: suspend a user
  15. Okta Help: deactivate a user account
  16. Mandiant (Google Cloud): You can't audit me, APT29 continues targeting Microsoft 365 (18 August 2022)