in this guide
Picture a 90-person firm that moved everyone to passkeys in the spring. Sign-in got faster, the phishing simulations stopped catching anyone, and the IT lead crossed “MFA” off the risk list. In October the sales director drops her phone in a lake. She calls IT from her partner’s phone, and ten minutes later she is back in. Nobody at the firm can say exactly what the person on that call checked.
That call is where passkeys move the problem. They close the fake login page for good. They do not change who can add a new key, where the key is stored, or what happens when someone loses every device they own. This guide is about those three places. The helpdesk reset guide covers how a caller talks their way past a reset; the device code guide covers an attack a passkey cannot see at all.
what passkeys actually fix
A passkey is a pair of keys. The private key stays with the user, on a phone, a laptop or a security key. The service keeps only the public key. Microsoft’s documentation describes passkeys as origin-bound: the key pair is unique to one service, so the passkey only works on the site or app it was created for. The browser will not offer it to a lookalike domain.
That ends three attacks at once.
Typed passwords and codes. There is nothing to type, so a fake page has nothing to collect. NIST’s SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, says any method where the user types an output from a device can never count as phishing-resistant, and it requires services at its middle assurance level to offer at least one method that is.
Relay kits. Kits like the one in the Tycoon2FA record sit between the user and the real page and pass the code through. A passkey checks the domain, and the relay’s domain is wrong. The session and token theft explainer leans on this.
Push fatigue and SIM swaps. CISA’s Scattered Spider advisory, updated on 29 July 2025, recommends FIDO or certificate-based MFA because it is not susceptible to push bombing or SIM swap attacks.
What a passkey does not touch is everything after the sign-in and everything around it. Microsoft’s own deployment guide warns that attackers who can no longer phish credentials may go after tokens on the device instead. In device code phishing the victim signs in on Microsoft’s genuine page, so the passkey works exactly as designed and the tokens still go to the attacker; reasoning from the mechanism, a passkey makes that attack no harder.
what a passkey closes, and what stays open
- the fake login pagethe key will not work on the wrong domain
- codes and push promptsnothing to type, nothing to approve by mistake
- the backup methodpassword, text code or app prompt still enabled
- the sync accountthe Apple or Google account that holds and restores the key
- the way back inthe temporary pass or reset when every device is gone
- the genuine pagedevice code sign-ins and tokens issued after sign-in
still open after rolloutclosed by the passkey
A passkey protects one step. Every other step keeps the lock it had before.
two kinds of passkey
Passkeys come in two forms, and they fail in different ways.
device-bound and synced, side by side
device-bound
security key, Microsoft Authenticator
- The private key never leaves one device
- The company can check the make and model at registration
- Phone lost: the passkey is gone, and someone has to let the user back in
- Employee leaves: the key is useless once the account is closed
synced
iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, password managers
- The key is copied to every device signed in to the same provider account
- No make-and-model check is possible
- Phone lost: the key comes back through the provider's own recovery
- Employee leaves: the key stays in their account until each service deletes it
The FIDO Alliance, the industry body behind the standard, describes synced passkeys as copied between a user’s devices through a cloud service, and device-bound ones as never leaving a single device. Microsoft’s Entra documentation adds the detail that matters to an admin: synced passkeys do not support attestation, the check that tells you which product created the key. Microsoft recommends security keys for admins and highly regulated users, and synced passkeys for most other staff.
NIST draws the same line. Under SP 800-63B-4, synced passkeys can be used up to its middle assurance level but never at the highest one, because the key can be copied. For federal systems, it requires the sync account itself to be one the agency manages. Its appendix on syncable authenticators also notes that centrally revoking access based on these keys is “challenging”.
the account the passkey lives in
A synced passkey is as safe as the account that stores it. For most people at a small company, that is the Apple or Google account on their phone, which can be a personal one.
Apple’s support page on passkey security describes the way back in after losing every device: sign in to iCloud, respond to a text message, then enter a device passcode, and the keychain is restored from Apple’s escrow. That process is reasonable for a consumer. For a company it means the recovery of a work credential runs through an account the company does not own, under a process it did not design. Apple’s Passwords app also lets users share passkeys with a Shared Group of family members and trusted contacts, and NIST’s guidance tells public-facing services to assume any synced passkey may be shared.
The passkey works as designed here. What changes is the question of where your company’s login keys may live, and most tenants have answered it by default.
Microsoft Entra. Passkeys are available in every Entra edition, including the free one. Microsoft’s how-to says that if you have not opted in to passkey profiles and attestation is off, synced passkeys are already enabled. With attestation off, Microsoft says Entra cannot tell whether a given passkey is synced or device-bound. Passkey profiles let you require device-bound keys with attestation for one group, such as admins, and allow synced ones for everyone else.
Google Workspace. The admin setting lets users skip passwords with a passkey. Google’s help page notes that platforms sync passkeys using Google Accounts, and that restricting passkeys to hardware keys stops passkeys stored on phones and computers from working.
Okta. An org-wide setting blocks synced passkeys for new enrollments. Okta’s documentation says the check is not based on attestation: it blocks authenticators known to create syncable passkeys, such as Google Password Manager, iCloud Keychain and 1Password.
the backup method nobody turned off
Most rollouts add passkeys and keep everything else. Google’s help page says turning on passwordless sign-in does not remove the user’s password. Microsoft’s Temporary Access Pass page says the same about the pass.
An attacker only needs one method the passkey did not replace. Proofpoint, a security vendor, published research on 12 August 2025 showing a relay kit that tells the victim their browser cannot use a passkey and offers the other methods on the account. The victim picks a text code or an app prompt, and the kit captures the session. Proofpoint says the attack relies on an alternative method existing, and that it had not yet seen it used in the wild.
The backup method also decides who can add a new passkey. Microsoft’s documentation requires users to have completed MFA within the past five minutes before registering a passkey, and its deployment guide expects existing users to register their first passkey with the MFA they already have. Whoever holds the old method can enrol a key of their own. CISA’s advisory describes Scattered Spider doing exactly this after getting in: registering their own MFA tokens to stay.
The fix is enforcement. In Entra, a Conditional Access policy with the built-in “Phishing-resistant MFA” authentication strength makes the passkey the only way in for the people and apps it covers. Microsoft’s guide creates it in report-only mode first, for all users except emergency access accounts, which the break-glass guide covers. Conditional Access needs Entra ID P1.
the lost phone is a help desk call
A device-bound passkey in an authenticator app goes into the lake with the phone. Microsoft’s answer is the Temporary Access Pass: a time-limited code an admin creates so the user can sign in without their lost method and register a new one. Microsoft’s documentation states the defaults:
- Authentication Administrators can issue a pass for ordinary users; Privileged Authentication Administrators can issue one for admins too.
- The default lifetime is one hour, and the policy allows up to 30 days.
- One-time use is off by default, so a pass can be used more than once while it is valid.
Whoever issues that pass is now the strongest lock on the account. They decide who the caller is, which is the problem the helpdesk reset guide describes and the MGM record shows. CISA’s advisory describes Scattered Spider posing as employees to get help desks to move MFA to a device the attackers control. A passkey rollout makes that call more valuable, because it becomes the main way in that is left.
Three things keep the recovery path from undoing the rollout. Microsoft recommends every user has at least two methods registered, and Okta advises enrolling passkeys on more than one device, so a lost phone leaves the user with a second way in and no call to make. NIST’s SP 800-63B-4 requires that every account recovery sends a notification to the user, which makes the real person the alarm if someone else recovered their account. And Microsoft’s guide says users who recover after a lost device should remove the old methods.
when someone leaves
For accounts behind your identity provider, a leaver is simple: disable the account and the passkeys stop working, wherever the copies are. Removing the user’s methods in the admin centre finishes the job.
The gap is every service where staff registered a passkey directly. The domain registrar, the company social accounts, a cloud console’s root login, the tools listed in apps outside SSO. Each holds its own public key. A synced copy of the private key sits in the leaver’s personal keychain and keeps working until someone deletes the key at each service, which is the revocation problem NIST describes. The token that lives forever is the same story told about tokens.
The reverse also happens. A shared account, such as the registrar login in the domain guide, protected by one passkey in one person’s iCloud, leaves the company with that person. Shared admin accounts covers why those logins need more than one named holder. For a short version of all this, see the passkeys explainer.
If your sales director lost her phone tonight, who would let her back in tomorrow, and what would they check before they did?
sources
- FIDO Alliance: passkeys
- NIST: SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines, Authentication and Authenticator Management (final, July 2025)
- NIST: SP 800-63B-4, full text including Appendix B, syncable authenticators
- Microsoft Learn: passkeys (FIDO2) authentication method in Microsoft Entra ID
- Microsoft Learn: how to enable passkeys (FIDO2) in Microsoft Entra ID
- Microsoft Learn: plan a phishing-resistant passwordless authentication deployment in Microsoft Entra ID
- Microsoft Learn: get started with a phishing-resistant passwordless authentication deployment (license requirements)
- Microsoft Learn: configure a Temporary Access Pass in Microsoft Entra ID
- Google Workspace Admin Help: allow users to skip passwords at sign-in
- Apple Support: about the security of passkeys (16 September 2024)
- Apple Support: use the Passwords app to create, manage and share passwords and passkeys (10 June 2026)
- Okta Help: configure the Passkey (FIDO2 WebAuthn) access controls
- Okta Help: configure the Passkey (FIDO2 WebAuthn) authenticator
- Proofpoint: Don't Phish-let Me Down, FIDO authentication downgrade (12 August 2025)
- CISA, FBI and partners: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A, updated 29 July 2025)
