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passkeys

A passkey will not work on a fake login page. Whoever lets a locked-out user back in still decides who gets the account.

in one lineA passkey is a sign-in key pair whose private key stays on the user's device or in their synced keychain and only works on the site it was created for.

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1what it is

A passkey replaces the password with a pair of keys. The private key stays with the user, on a phone, a laptop or a security key. The service keeps only the public key. Microsoft's Entra documentation describes the pair as unique to one service, so the passkey only works on the site or app it was created for. A lookalike domain gets nothing.

That closes the attacks built on typing or tapping: fake login pages, relayed one-time codes and push prompts approved by mistake. NIST's SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, says no method where the user types an authenticator output can count as phishing-resistant. CISA's Scattered Spider advisory, last updated on 29 July 2025, recommends FIDO-based MFA because it is not susceptible to push bombing or SIM swaps.

Passkeys come in two kinds. Device-bound passkeys, on a security key or in Microsoft Authenticator, never leave one device. Synced passkeys, in iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager or a password manager, are copied to every device signed in to the same provider account. Microsoft's documentation notes that synced passkeys do not support attestation, the check that tells an admin which product created the key. The passkeys guide covers both in depth.

2why it accumulates

A rollout adds passkeys and rarely takes anything away.

The old methods stay on. Most accounts keep the password, text codes and app prompts. Proofpoint, a security vendor, published research on 12 August 2025 showing a relay kit that tells the victim their passkey cannot be used and offers the other methods on the account. Proofpoint says the attack relies on an alternative method existing, and that it had not yet seen it used in the wild.

The key lives in someone else's account. A synced passkey is as safe as the Apple or Google account that stores it. Apple's support page on passkey security says a user who loses every device can recover the keychain from Apple's escrow by signing in to iCloud, answering a text message and entering a device passcode. When a work passkey is saved on a personal phone, its recovery runs through an account the company does not own. NIST's appendix on syncable authenticators tells public-facing services to assume any synced passkey may be shared.

A lost phone becomes a call. Microsoft's answer is the Temporary Access Pass, a time-limited code an admin creates so the user can sign in and register a new key. Microsoft's documentation gives a default lifetime of one hour, allows up to 30 days, and leaves one-time use switched off by default.

Leavers keep copies. Disabling an account in your identity provider stops its passkeys everywhere. Services where staff registered a passkey directly, such as those in apps outside SSO, each hold their own key, and a synced copy stays in the leaver's keychain until someone deletes it at each service. NIST's appendix calls central revocation of these keys "challenging".

3what it costs you

The method itself works. The FIDO Alliance, the industry body behind passkeys, reported in its Passkey Index of 15 October 2026 that 36% of successful sign-ins at the services contributing data used a passkey, up from 26% in 2025, and that passkey sign-ins succeeded 93% of the time against 78% for traditional MFA. These are pooled figures from contributing services the 2026 summary does not name, and they say nothing about recovery.

Recovery is where the cost moves. CISA's advisory describes Scattered Spider posing as employees to get help desks to reset passwords and move MFA to a device the attackers control, then registering their own MFA tokens to stay. After a passkey rollout, a reset that ends with the attacker enrolling a new passkey hands them the strongest credential on the account. The helpdesk reset guide and the MGM record show how that call goes.

Some attacks never touch the passkey. In device code phishing the victim signs in on Microsoft's genuine page, so, reasoning from the mechanism, the passkey works as designed and the tokens still go to the attacker. Session and token theft covers what happens after sign-in.

what it looks like when it goes wrong

Three ways this tends to go, each one taken from a real case.

your company
the gap nobody seesOnce passkeys are in, the weakest lock on an account is the way back in when the passkey is gone.a help desk that resets on request
  1. howA caller poses as an admin and gets a password and code reset in minutes.
    what leavesadmin control of identity and cloudwho ends up with itattackers who deploy ransomware
    it happenedMGM Resorts, 2023
  2. howAn outsourced desk resets an account three times without checking the caller.
    what leavesa fully working employee loginwho ends up with itan intruder who looks legitimate everywhere
    it happenedClorox and Cognizant, 2023
  3. howThe support vendor itself is talked into giving access.
    what leavesthe customer databasewho ends up with itan extortion group
    it happenedCaesars Entertainment, 2023

4what works

  • Require passkeys where they matter most. Start with admins and finance: set your identity provider's access policy so phishing-resistant sign-in is the only accepted method for them, in report-only mode first. Leave emergency accounts out on purpose, as the break-glass guide describes.
  • Decide where work passkeys may live. Microsoft recommends security keys for users with elevated privileges and synced passkeys for most other staff. Write down which accounts may hold a work key.
  • Give everyone a second way in that is not a phone call. A passkey on a second device or a spare security key means a lost phone needs no reset.
  • Make the recovery path strict. In Entra, Authentication Administrators can issue a Temporary Access Pass for ordinary users and Privileged Authentication Administrators for admins too, per Microsoft's documentation. Keep that list short, turn on one-time use, shorten the lifetime and use a call-back rule. NIST's SP 800-63B-4 requires every account recovery to notify the user, which makes the real person the alarm.
  • Close the leaver gap outside SSO. For each shared or directly registered account, note whose keychain holds the passkey and remove it when that person leaves.

If someone at your company lost their phone tonight, who would let them back in tomorrow, and what would that person check first?

on the record

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your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    List every sign-in method still enabled next to passkeys, and every person who can issue a temporary pass or reset MFA.

    An attacker needs only one of those paths. Vendor research shows relay kits steering people to the backup method, and CISA describes help desks being talked into moving MFA to an attacker's device.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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