in this guide
Every company that hands out laptops and phones ends up with a device management console: Microsoft Intune, Jamf, Google’s endpoint management, or something similar. It installs apps, pushes settings, and when a laptop is left on a train, it erases that laptop from a browser tab. That last button is the reason the console exists, and it works the same way for one device or for all of them.
In March 2026 that stopped being a theoretical point. After the attack on Stryker, covered on the Stryker incident page, CISA published an alert on 18 March 2026 urging organisations to harden their endpoint management systems. Its three asks were least privilege for admin roles, phishing-resistant MFA, and approval by a second admin account before destructive actions.
This guide is about the permission behind that button: who holds it, where it hides, and what each of the big three consoles lets you put in front of it. It applies blast radius to one single permission.
The wipe button is a normal IT feature. The question is how many people can press it, and whether anyone has to agree first.
The company phone still locked to someone who left covers the Apple side of device ownership.
the button is a role, and the role spreads
Picture a 150-person company with one IT lead and an outside IT provider. Ask the IT lead who can wipe company laptops and the answer is “me, and maybe the provider”. Then open the role list.
In Intune, Microsoft’s wipe documentation lists who can run the action: the built-in Help Desk Operator role, the School Administrator role, or any custom role that includes the Remote tasks/Wipe permission. Microsoft’s built-in roles reference confirms that Help Desk Operator carries Wipe and Retire, alongside remote control of devices. The role meant for first-line support can factory reset a laptop. Above those roles sit the tenant-wide ones: Microsoft’s documentation describes Intune Administrator as full read and write access to Intune, and its approval documentation handles changes from Global Administrator accounts the same way.
In Google Workspace, the help page on wiping devices says the action needs the Mobile Device Management administrator privilege from the device list, or the User management privilege from a user’s page. A custom admin role built years ago for “people who reset passwords” may well carry the second one.
In Jamf, Jamf’s own security briefing on the management plane says Wipe Computer and Wipe Mobile Device are separate privileges you can switch off for a role. They are on wherever someone ticked them or copied a role that had them.
who can press wipe in a typical tenant
- the IT leadthe one everyone names
- Global Administrator accountsoften three or four, some from setup day
- help desk rolebuilt for password resets, carries wipe
- the IT providerdelegated admin into your tenant
- an automation appgranted wipe through the API for a script
- whoever can assign rolescan give any of the above to anyone
holds wipe, rarely countedexpected
the doors nobody counts
Three holders of the wipe permission tend to fall outside any admin review.
Apps hold it too. Microsoft’s Graph documentation lists one permission for the wipe call, DeviceManagementManagedDevices.PrivilegedOperations.All, and it can be granted to an application as well as a person. A reporting script or an old integration that asked for broad device permissions years ago can erase devices without a human signing in. The identity you can’t offboard covers why those registrations outlive the project that created them.
Your IT provider holds it. Outsourced IT usually manages devices through delegated admin rights in your tenant, and every technician at the provider with that access sits on your list. The IT provider guide covers how long that access lasts and who at the provider holds it.
Whoever assigns roles holds it indirectly. Microsoft’s built-in roles reference describes Intune Role Administrator as the role that assigns permissions to administrators. Anyone who can assign roles, in Intune or in the directory above it, can hand wipe to an account of their choosing.
what each console lets you put in front of it
Removing people from the list is the first control. The second is making one person unable to wipe on their own. Here the three consoles differ, according to their own documentation as of November 2026.
Microsoft Intune has Multi Admin Approval. Microsoft’s documentation describes access policies that hold a change until a different administrator approves it. They can cover device actions (wipe, retire and delete), app deployments, configuration and compliance policies, Windows scripts and role changes. The requester cannot approve their own request, and the documentation says this applies to Global Administrator and Intune Administrator accounts too. It also covers calls made by applications through the Graph API, unless an app is explicitly excluded from the policy.
Google Workspace has multi-party approval, without device wipe. Google’s help page lists the actions it protects: 2-Step Verification and recovery settings, SSO, domain-wide delegation, domain changes, Vault exports, admin role assignments and a few more. Device wipe is not on that list as of 13 November 2026. Role assignment is, which helps with the indirect door above.
Jamf’s own briefing names the missing second approval. Jamf’s security briefing on the management plane lists “no multi-admin approval” as a risk. Its suggested answers are narrow privilege sets, federated sign-in with conditional access, and approval through the change process for configuration managed as code.
Microsoft’s limits are worth knowing. Intune’s device actions page says a tenant can submit up to 500 wipe actions per day, and bulk actions reach up to 100 devices at a time. For a company of 20 to 500 people, 500 is the whole fleet, so that limit protects larger tenants and does little for yours.
how the approval works, and where it leaks
a wipe under Multi Admin Approval
- 1admin requests a wipeWrites a business justification. Nothing happens to the device yet.
- 2a second admin reviewsMust sit in the approver group and be a different account.
- 3approve or rejectThe requester then selects Complete and the wipe runs.
- 4the trapOne person who can create a second admin account can be both people.
Microsoft’s documentation describes several details that decide whether the control holds up in practice.
- It needs two real admins. The tenant must have at least two administrator accounts. A company with one IT person needs a second approver, and that is a staffing decision as much as a setting.
- Nobody gets told. Intune sends no notification when a request is created or changes status. Requests that sit untouched for 3 days expire. Agree with your approvers how urgent requests reach them.
- Exclusions are holes. An enterprise application excluded from a policy can change the protected resource without approval. Microsoft’s page warns that each exclusion is a gap.
- Protecting roles can lock you out. A policy on role changes protects the role assignments the approval itself depends on, and Microsoft’s documentation describes a deadlock and its fix. Set up the other policies first.
The trap in the diagram follows from how the approval works. Intune checks that two different accounts were used. It cannot know whether one person controls both. BleepingComputer reported on 16 March 2026, citing a source familiar with the attack, that the intruder at Stryker compromised an admin account and created a new Global Administrator account before devices were wiped. Stryker has not confirmed this, as the Stryker incident page records. Approval by a second account only helps if creating that second account is itself watched. That means alerts on new admin accounts and new members of the approver group, and, in Google Workspace, multi-party approval on role assignment.
the emergency path and the evidence
Every approval scheme needs a way around it for the day the approvers are unreachable and a stolen laptop must be erased. Microsoft’s Intune Customer Success blog of 14 March 2026 recommends a documented break-glass path with a review afterwards. Keep it to named accounts, and check its use every time. The break-glass guide covers how to keep such an account from becoming the most dangerous one you have.
Then make sure the record survives. Microsoft and Jamf both document audit logs for device commands and approval requests, but logs age out. If a wipe or a role change ever needs explaining, the question will be who had admin on a given date, and whether anyone exported the log in time.
The same reasoning applies to the other consoles that can destroy at scale. The console that manages your backups is the obvious next one, covered in the backup admin guide. Kaseya VSA showed the provider-side version, a central tool pushing to every endpoint.
When you finish the count, compare it with the answer the IT lead gave from memory. How many names were missing?
on the record
all myths →sources
- CISA: CISA Urges Endpoint Management System Hardening After Cyberattack Against US Organization, 18 March 2026
- Microsoft Learn: Wipe devices with Microsoft Intune
- Microsoft Learn: Device actions in Microsoft Intune (daily tenant limits, bulk device actions)
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Intune built-in roles reference
- Microsoft Learn: Use Multi Admin Approval in Intune
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Graph wipe action (permissions)
- Microsoft Intune Customer Success blog: Best practices for securing Microsoft Intune, 14 March 2026
- Google Workspace Admin Help: Wipe corporate data from a device
- Google Workspace Admin Help: Multi-party approval for sensitive actions
- BleepingComputer: Stryker attack wiped tens of thousands of devices, no malware needed, 16 March 2026
- Jamf Concepts: Protecting your MDM management plane (Jamf security briefing)
