mythsthe appsKlue2026saas / cross-sector

everyone assumed:

a token from a project nobody works on anymore can't open anything that matters

what was actually true:

A leftover developer token at Klue could still change the code that held its customers' Salesforce keys, and in June 2026 that was enough to reach their CRM data.

how it happened

  1. whoan attackerheld a compromised GitHub token; how is unknown
  2. the targetKlue's integration servicea legacy credential could still change its code
  3. thencustomers' Salesforcequeried with each customer's own approved token
  4. the resultCRM data takenno official count of companies
  5. how it stoppedSalesforce flags it12 June 2026, tokens rotated
where it was aimed where it stopped

what everyone assumed

Nobody at Klue or among its customers has said what they believed beforehand, so this belief is an inference from what happened. It is a common one. A token made for a prototype that went nowhere feels like scrap: nothing runs on it, nobody remembers it, and the project it was made for is gone. Its customers held a matching belief one step away. They approved a connection between Klue and their Salesforce, and thought of the risk as the permissions on that connection. The developer accounts that could change the vendor’s code were out of sight and seemed like someone else’s housekeeping.

what happened

Klue gives two descriptions of the way in. On 18 June 2026 its CEO wrote that an attacker gained access through a compromised legacy credential linked to an integration service. On 1 July 2026, after CrowdStrike finished its investigation on 30 June, Klue’s summary said that on 11 June 2026 the attacker used “a previously compromised GitHub personal access token” to put unauthorized code into Klue’s integration service. That code collected third-party integration credentials, including OAuth access and refresh tokens for Salesforce. Klue does not say outright that the two descriptions refer to the same credential, and it says CrowdStrike did not determine how the attacker got the token in the first place.

How old the token was comes from one source. Huntress, a victim, wrote that the attacker seems to have used “a long-disused but still active credential”, made to prototype a third-party integration that Klue later abandoned. Klue’s own posts do not describe the token’s age or use.

With the customer tokens in hand, the attacker read customers’ Salesforce through the REST API. ReliaQuest, a security vendor, reported in its research that scripts with a Python-urllib user agent listed Salesforce objects and paged through query results, with nearly a thousand queries in 15 minutes in at least one environment. Recorded Future said elements of its Salesforce account were reached through a compromised OAuth token, an impact it believed was limited to business data such as client contact names and email addresses. Gong said Klue told it an unauthorized actor had reached Klue’s integration service, and that some customers using the Klue integration may have had user names, titles and emails accessed.

Attribution is not settled by any primary source. Huntress said it had high confidence that a group calling itself Icarus is responsible, based on matching identifiers in extortion emails and a leak site. ReliaQuest reported a claim on Telegram on 21 June 2026 by an account using the ShinyHunters name, and could not confirm it. Klue called it a criminal act and named no one.

step by step

  1. customers connect Klue to their CRMKlue's integration service holds an OAuth token into each customer's Salesforce.
  2. 11 June 2026an old GitHub token still worksKlue says a previously compromised personal access token was used to put unauthorized code into the integration service.the assumption breaks here
  3. customer tokens are collectedThe code gathered OAuth access and refresh tokens for Salesforce, and scripts then queried customer records.
  4. 12 June 2026Salesforce notifies KlueKlue disables the affected pods and tokens and rotates OAuth credentials the same morning.
  5. 16 to 23 June 2026extortion and public noticesVictims receive extortion emails and publish their own statements; Salesforce disables the Klue Battlecards connection.

how it surfaced

Salesforce raised the alarm. On 12 June 2026 Salesforce notified Klue of suspected unauthorized activity coming from Klue’s API integration service, and that morning Klue disabled the affected GKE pods, disabled the compromised GitHub tokens and rotated OAuth credentials. Klue then disabled its integrations with Salesforce, HubSpot, SharePoint, Zoom, Gong, Chorus, Clari, Google Drive and Slack, as Huntress and BleepingComputer reported. BleepingComputer reported on 18 June 2026 that Salesforce had disabled the connection between the Klue Battlecards app and Salesforce until further notice. Gong deactivated every token tied to the Klue integration and blocked four IP addresses Klue gave it.

Some victims learned the rest from the attacker. Huntress staff began receiving extortion emails on 16 June 2026. Recorded Future confirmed the impact on its Salesforce on 17 June. By Risky Bulletin’s count on 22 June 2026, updated 23 June, eight companies had confirmed Klue-related breaches, most of them security firms. Klue has published no total, and larger figures in circulation come from the attackers.

Klue’s fixes, listed in its 1 July 2026 summary, start where the attacker started: it blocked personal access tokens across its GitHub organisation, both classic and fine-grained, and moved workflows to GitHub Apps and short-lived credentials that expire on their own. The same route through vendor tokens into Salesforce ran through Salesloft Drift and Gainsight in 2025, and a forgotten leftover that still worked is also the story of Midnight Blizzard’s retired test tenant.

A token from an abandoned project keeps every right it was given, and at a vendor those rights can reach your data.

The guide on the token that lives forever explains why nothing retires such a token on its own, and GitHub as your identity surface covers who in your organisation holds tokens like this one.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour sales team uses a handy tool that reads and writes your CRM, approved once by whoever set it up.
the gap nobody seesAt the vendor, an old developer key from a project they dropped can still change the code that holds your CRM key.a connected app with standing access
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersSomeone gets that old key, changes the code, and collects the keys of every customer at once.
    what it costs youYour customer contacts and deal notes are copied out without anyone logging in to your systems, and you hear about it from the vendor.
  2. or it goes like this
    howA chat tool's key into your CRM is stolen from the vendor.
    what leavessupport tickets, including passwords pasted into themwho ends up with itan extortion group working through hundreds of companies
    it happenedSalesloft / Drift, 2025
  3. or it goes like this
    howIntegration keys to your code host are stolen from the integration vendor.
    what leavesyour private code and the secrets inside itwho ends up with itattackers looking for the next door
    it happenedGitHub OAuth tokens, 2022

sources

  1. Klue: CrowdStrike Investigation Summary and Security Improvements, 1 July 2026
  2. Klue: An Update on the Recent Klue Security Incident, 18 June 2026
  3. Huntress: Cybercrime Breaches Klue: Salesforce Data Impacted for Many Victims, including Huntress (18 June 2026, updated to 24 June)
  4. ReliaQuest: Klue Integration Abused in Salesforce Data Theft (vendor research, 17 June 2026, updated 22 June)
  5. Recorded Future: Klue security incident (June 2026)
  6. Gong: Klue Security Incident, 19 June 2026
  7. BleepingComputer: Klue OAuth breach linked to Icarus Salesforce data theft attacks, 18 June 2026
  8. Risky Bulletin: Klue breach impacts security firms, 22 June 2026 (updated 23 June)
  9. GitHub Docs: Setting a personal access token policy for your organization

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    List every GitHub token that can write to your code, and revoke the ones nobody can name a current use for.

    Ask each developer which personal access tokens they hold for your organisation and what each one is for. An organisation owner can also set a policy: GitHub's documentation describes restricting classic tokens, requiring approval for fine-grained ones, and setting a maximum lifetime, with 366 days as the default limit for fine-grained tokens and no required expiry for classic ones. Setting a limit does not revoke existing tokens, and tokens inside the limit keep working, so revoke the unused ones yourself. Then open your CRM's connected apps, as the guide on [Salesforce connected apps](/read/salesforce-apps) describes, and for each vendor that holds a token, ask the vendor in writing how it protects the code that stores it.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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