in this guide
Every website, login page and API your company runs over HTTPS presents a TLS certificate. It is a credential: it proves to a browser that the server is really yours. Unlike most credentials covered on this site, it carries an expiry date, and when that date passes the browser refuses the connection. Customers see a full-page warning. Integrations stop.
For years that date came round once a year, and one person remembered it. That is changing on a published schedule. The rules that every public certificate authority follows now cap a certificate at 200 days, and the cap falls to 47 days by March 2029. Renewal becomes something a machine does, often, using access to your domain that somebody has to own.
This guide treats certificates as what they are: machine identities, close cousins of the ones in the identity you can’t offboard. It covers the schedule, who renews, who can get a certificate for your domain, and what the documented outages have in common.
A certificate is the one credential that switches itself off. The question is whether anyone notices before your customers do.
the schedule, from the rulebook
Public certificates are governed by the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements, a rulebook voted on by certificate authorities and browser makers. Section 6.3.2 of version 2.3.1, dated 4 October 2026, sets the maximum lifetime by issue date:
- Issued before 15 March 2026: at most 398 days.
- Issued on or after 15 March 2026 and before 15 March 2027: at most 200 days.
- Issued on or after 15 March 2027 and before 15 March 2029: at most 100 days.
- Issued on or after 15 March 2029: at most 47 days.
The schedule was adopted through Ballot SC-081v3, proposed by Apple. The Forum’s ballot page records the vote, which closed on 11 April 2025: 25 certificate authorities in favour, none against, five abstaining, and all four browser members voting yes (Apple, Google, Microsoft and Mozilla). The first step has already happened. Any public certificate bought since 15 March 2026 lasts 200 days at most.
maximum lifetime of a public certificate, by issue date
- 1398 daysIssued before 15 March 2026. About one renewal a year.
- 2200 daysFrom 15 March 2026. About two a year. In force now.
- 3100 daysFrom 15 March 2027. About four a year. Manual renewal stops being realistic.
- 447 daysFrom 15 March 2029. About eight a year, each with fresh proof of control.
The same rulebook shrinks a second number that matters as much. Before issuing, an authority must check that you control the domain. Section 4.2.1 says how long that check may be reused: 398 days before 15 March 2026, 200 days from then, 100 days from 15 March 2027, and 10 days from 15 March 2029. From 2029, almost every renewal needs a new proof that you control the domain, which means something has to be able to change your DNS or your web server on demand.
Let’s Encrypt, a free certificate authority, is moving faster than the cap. Its announcement of 2 December 2025 sets out an opt-in 45-day profile from 13 May 2026, a 64-day default from 10 February 2027 and a 45-day default from 16 February 2028. It warns that a renewal job hardcoded to run every 60 days will stop being enough.
renewal becomes a machine job with standing access
At eight renewals a year per certificate, a calendar reminder and a person with a login no longer work. Renewal moves to automation, usually a client speaking the ACME protocol on the server, or a cloud provider’s managed certificates. Automation needs credentials of its own, and those credentials outlive whoever set them up.
An account key with the certificate authority. The ACME client registers an account and keeps its key on the server. Whoever holds that key can request certificates for any domain the account can prove control of.
A DNS token that can write records. A common way to prove control is to publish a temporary DNS record. So the renewal job holds an API token for your DNS provider, and in many setups that token can edit every record in the zone, including where your email goes. The domain guide covers what an attacker does with DNS write access.
A login at the hosting or CDN provider. Many companies let the provider handle certificates. It works until the provider’s account belongs to an agency you stopped paying, or to someone who left. The vendor proof guide covers whose name sits on those accounts.
“Managed” also has conditions. AWS’s documentation says its certificate manager renews a DNS-validated certificate automatically when two things hold at 45 days before expiry: the certificate is in use by an AWS service, and the validation CNAME records it asked for are still in public DNS. Someone tidying old DNS records can delete the one that keeps renewal working. AWS then sends warning events at 30, 15, 7, 3 and 1 days, to whatever monitoring someone connected.
The old safety net is thinner too. Let’s Encrypt stopped sending expiry reminder emails on 4 June 2025, citing automation, privacy and cost. Any company that relied on those emails now gets no warning from Let’s Encrypt.
The renewal script is a service account with write access to your DNS. Treat it like one.
who can get a certificate for your domain
Expiry is the reliability problem. Issuance is the access problem: any certificate authority that believes you control the domain will issue a certificate in its name. CISA’s Emergency Directive 19-01 of January 2019 describes the attack: someone who changes your DNS records can also get valid certificates for your domains.
who can get a valid certificate for your domain
- the authority you buy fromexpected, and named in your records
- any public authority at allwhen your domain publishes no CAA record
- an old renewal serverstill holding an account key and a DNS token
- the agency or hostthat set up the website years ago
- anyone with your DNS loginor a token that can write records
can issue, rarely countedexpected
Two controls narrow the list, and both are DNS records you can read today.
A CAA record names the authorities allowed to issue. RFC 8659 defines it, and the Baseline Requirements oblige every public authority to check it before issuing. With no CAA record, RFC 8659 leaves issuance unrestricted, so any authority may issue once it is satisfied you control the domain.
The record can also pin one account. RFC 8657 adds an accounturi parameter naming a specific account at that authority, and a validationmethods parameter limiting how control may be proved. Today the Baseline Requirements say authorities should honour them. From 15 March 2027, section 4.2.2.1.2 says they must. A domain pinned this way only gets certificates through the one account you chose, which turns that account’s key into the thing worth guarding.
Public certificates are recorded in Certificate Transparency logs that anyone can search. CISA’s 2019 directive told US federal agencies to watch those logs for certificates they did not request. For a small company, a search on your domain lists every public certificate issued for it, by which authority, and when. Certificates you cannot explain are your list of unknown owners.
the outages that did not happen on a website
The new schedule applies only to public certificates. The certificates inside your own systems, issued by an internal authority or shipped inside a vendor’s product, expire on their own timetable, and the documented outages mostly came from those.
Equifax, 2017. The US Government Accountability Office’s report GAO-18-559 says Equifax had a device to inspect network traffic, and that, according to Equifax officials, an expired digital certificate left encrypted traffic uninspected. GAO says the certificate had expired about 10 months before the breach. When an administrator updated it and inspection restarted, signs of the intrusion showed up.
Ericsson, December 2018. Ericsson said on 6 December 2018 that its initial analysis pointed to an expired certificate in two software versions of a core network component, disrupting service for customers in several countries. The Register reported that O2 in the UK and the operators running on its network were among them. The certificate lived inside the vendor’s software.
Microsoft Azure, February 2013. Microsoft’s archived post records an interruption in all regions for customers using Azure storage over HTTPS, from 12:29 PM PST on 22 February 2013 to 00:09 AM PST the next day. In Microsoft’s account, as InfoQ reported it, monitoring had warned staff that new certificates were needed, but the update carrying them was not marked as urgent and was deprioritised. Microsoft named “a breakdown in our procedures for maintaining and monitoring these certificates” as the root cause.
The pattern repeats across all three: a certificate with no clear owner, a warning that reached nobody who acted, and an expiry date that nobody checked against what was actually running. It is the same shape as the rule nobody remembers, with a deadline attached.
Picture a 150-person company in 2028. The marketing site renews itself through the host. The customer portal uses a certificate an engineer set up with a script before leaving. The VPN appliance and the old file server carry certificates from the vendor’s setup wizard. Nobody has a list, so each one surfaces only on the morning it fails. The edge devices guide covers who owns those appliances.
who owns it
Shorter lifetimes are a decision made by browser makers and certificate authorities, on their timetable, much like the authentication changes in the vendor login guide. The useful response is ownership, and ownership fits on one page:
- One list of certificates: public ones from the Transparency logs, internal and appliance ones from whoever runs those systems.
- One named owner per certificate, a person with a deputy, and never a former employee’s mailbox.
- One way each renews, written down: the host, the cloud service, or a script on a named server with named credentials.
- One check at the endpoint, where a monitor reads the expiry date off the live site, because a renewed certificate sitting unused in a queue is how Azure went down in 2013.
When the 100-day cap arrives on 15 March 2027, which of your certificates will still depend on someone remembering?
sources
- CA/Browser Forum: Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates, Version 2.3.1, 4 October 2026 (source on GitHub)
- CA/Browser Forum: TLS Baseline Requirements 2.3.1 (PDF)
- CA/Browser Forum: Ballot SC-081v3, Introduce Schedule of Reducing Validity and Data Reuse Periods, April 2025
- Let's Encrypt: Decreasing Certificate Lifetimes to 45 Days, 2 December 2025
- Let's Encrypt: Ending Support for Expiration Notification Emails, 22 January 2025
- AWS Certificate Manager User Guide: Renewal for domains validated by DNS
- IETF RFC 8659: DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record, November 2019
- IETF RFC 8657: CAA Record Extensions for Account URI and ACME Method Binding, November 2019
- CISA: Emergency Directive 19-01, Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering, 22 January 2019
- US GAO: Data Protection, Actions Taken by Equifax and Federal Agencies in Response to the 2017 Breach (GAO-18-559), August 2018
- Ericsson: Update on software issue impacting certain customers, 6 December 2018
- The Register: report on the O2 and UK mobile outage traced to Ericsson software, 6 December 2018
- Microsoft (archived blog): Details of the February 22nd 2013 Windows Azure Storage Disruption
- InfoQ: report on the 22 February 2013 Windows Azure storage outage, 5 March 2013
