mythsthe appsMcHire (Paradox.ai)2025recruiting software / united states

everyone assumed:

our hiring platform only opens through our single sign-on

what was actually true:

McHire sent McDonald's users to single sign-on, and a separate login for the vendor's own staff still accepted a test account with a trivial password that Paradox says nobody had used since 2019.

how it happened

  1. whotwo researcherslooking at a hiring chatbot
  2. the targeta forgotten test accounttrivial password, unused since 2019 per Paradox
  3. thenan unchecked APIrecord IDs could be counted down
  4. the resultapplicant records reachable64 million per researchers, five viewed per Paradox
  5. how it stoppedreported and closedlogin dead within two hours
where it was aimed where it stopped

what everyone assumed

A company that rolls out a vendor’s platform and forces its own people through single sign-on has done the visible part well. Leavers lose access when their company account goes, logins carry the company’s own rules, and the platform looks like one more app behind the company’s front door. That was reasonable to believe about McHire, the chatbot hiring platform built by Paradox.ai. The researchers who examined it in 2025 describe it as used by 90% of McDonald’s franchisees, with a bot called Olivia that collects applicants’ contact details, shift preferences and personality test answers.

What single sign-on governs is the logins that go through it. The vendor’s own people need a way in too, and that way sat beside the customer’s.

what happened

Security researchers Ian Carroll and Sam Curry began looking at McHire after seeing complaints on Reddit that the bot gave nonsensical answers. Their write-up describes what they called a cursory review of a few hours.

The side door. The McHire sign-in page for restaurant owners tried to force single sign-on for McDonald’s. Next to it was a smaller link for Paradox team members. The researchers write that they entered a trivial value as both username and password and were logged in at once. Neither their account nor Paradox’s describes any second factor on that login.

The account behind it. They had become administrator of a test restaurant inside McHire, whose employees were all Paradox staff. Paradox’s own statement of 9 July 2025 says the researchers used a legacy password on a Paradox test account tied to a single client instance, that the password was never updated when the company changed its password standards, and that the account had not been logged into since 2019. Paradox adds that it “should have been decommissioned”.

The wall that was missing. From inside the test restaurant, the researchers found an API call that fetched candidate data by a numeric record ID. Their own test application sat at an ID of about 64 million. Lowering the number, they write, returned another applicant’s personal data: name, email, phone number, address, application status and form answers, plus a token to sign in to the applicant’s chat. The API did not check that the record belonged to the restaurant asking. Paradox says none of its penetration tests had found the flaw.

What each side says was reached. The researchers write that the two flaws together allowed access to the personal data of more than 64 million applicants. Paradox disputes the framing: it describes the records as chat interactions, a category it separates from job applications, says most were not tied to a candidate, and that the researchers pulled seven records, five of them US candidates with names, emails, phone numbers and IP addresses. BleepingComputer changed “applicants” to “applications” in its headline on 12 July 2025. The 64 million figure is the researchers’ estimate of what was reachable. The five is Paradox’s count of what was viewed. Neither has been independently verified.

step by step

  1. the platform sends the customer's people to SSOMcHire's sign-in page pushed McDonald's users to single sign-on, with a smaller link for Paradox team members beside it.
  2. 30 June 2025a test login still worksThe researchers tried a trivial username and password on the staff link and became admin of a test restaurant run by Paradox employees.the assumption breaks here
  3. 30 June 2025the API hands over other people's recordsLowering a record number in one API call returned contact details and chat data of real applicants, according to the researchers.
  4. 30 June to 1 July 2025disclosure and fixThe credentials stopped working within two hours of the report and Paradox confirmed the fix the next evening.
  5. 9 July 2025both sides go publicThe researchers put the reachable records above 64 million; Paradox says five candidates had information viewed, only by the researchers.

how it surfaced

The researchers found no public security contact and emailed people until the report reached the right teams. Their timeline: they reported to Paradox and McDonald’s at 5:46 PM Eastern on 30 June 2025, McDonald’s confirmed receipt 38 minutes later, the credentials stopped working at 7:31 PM, and Paradox confirmed the issues were resolved at 10:18 PM on 1 July.

Paradox says, based on its records, that nobody other than the researchers used the test account, that one client organisation was affected and that no Social Security numbers were exposed. It announced a security contact and a bug bounty, and wrote that it takes responsibility. McDonald’s, in a statement to Wired quoted by BleepingComputer, called it an “unacceptable vulnerability from a third-party provider” and said it was resolved the day it was reported.

The same pattern of a test identity outliving its purpose is on the record at Microsoft, where a legacy test tenant was the way in. The guide on access debt covers why such accounts survive, and the vendor access guide asks the question the McHire link answered: who at the vendor can see your data.

Your single sign-on covers your own people. The vendor’s staff login is a second door that your settings do not reach.

Ask each vendor that holds your customers’ or applicants’ data how its own staff sign in to your instance, and whether test accounts live there.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour company uses an online hiring tool, and everyone on your side signs in through the company login.
the gap nobody seesThe vendor keeps its own sign-in for its staff, with an old test account nobody switched off.a password is the only lock
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersSomeone curious tries the obvious password on that account, and it opens.
    what it costs youYour applicants' names and phone numbers sit one guess away, and your name is on the headline.
  2. or it goes like this
    howLeaked passwords are tried against customer accounts until some open.
    what leavespersonal details of customers and their contactswho ends up with itfraudsters
    it happened23andMe, 2023
  3. or it goes like this
    howAn old password opens a data store that never required a second step.
    what leavesthe whole database in one downloadwho ends up with itan extortion group
    it happenedThe Snowflake wave, 2024

sources

  1. Ian Carroll and Sam Curry: Would you like an IDOR with that? Leaking 64 million McDonald's job applications (disclosure 30 June 2025)
  2. Paradox: Responsible Security Update, 9 July 2025
  3. BleepingComputer: '123456' password exposed chats for 64 million McDonald's job chatbot applications, 11 July 2025

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Ask your hiring platform vendor in writing how its staff sign in to your account.

    Open the sign-in page of the tool that holds your applicants or customers and look for any second login path beside your company login. Then ask the vendor three things: which of its staff and test accounts can reach your instance, whether those logins need a second factor, and when it last removed accounts nobody uses. The single sign-on guide covers what single sign-on decides and what it leaves to other controls. McHire's side door had been unused since 2019, by Paradox's account, and still opened in June 2025.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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