mythsthe appsTeleMessage (Smarsh)2025message archiving software / united states and israel

everyone assumed:

an encrypted chat app stays encrypted when a compliance tool archives it

what was actually true:

TeleMessage's archiving version of Signal sent readable copies of messages to the vendor's own server, and in May 2025 a diagnostic address on that server handed its memory to anyone who asked.

how it happened

  1. whoan anonymous hackerby their own account, about 15 to 20 minutes of work
  2. the gapthe vendor's archive serverheld readable copies of messages on their way to customers' archives
  3. thenserver memory downloadedmessage content and login details in the snapshots
  4. the resultservices suspendedSmarsh paused TeleMessage on 5 May 2025; CISA listed three flaws as exploited
the gap that let it happen the result

what everyone assumed

Organisations that must keep records of business messages face a problem when staff use encrypted chat apps. TeleMessage, an Israeli company bought by the archiving vendor Smarsh (Smarsh’s release says the deal closed on 20 February 2024), sold a way to have both: modified versions of Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram and WeChat that capture messages for the archive. The Signal version was called TM SGNL.

The buyer’s belief was simple and backed by the vendor’s own words. TeleMessage’s documentation, as quoted in the official CVE record, promised “End-to-End encryption from the mobile phone through to the corporate archive”. If the app looks like Signal and the archive sits in your own Microsoft 365 or mail system, it is reasonable to think nobody in between can read the messages.

what happened

The copy in the middle. Signal’s encryption protects a message between phones. A phone has to decrypt a message to show it, and an archiving client then has the readable text in hand. Security researcher Micah Lee read the Android source code of TM SGNL, which TeleMessage had published, and wrote on 6 May 2025 that the app sends messages to an address on archive.telemessage.com, and that it looked to him as if they arrived there already decrypted. He was careful about the limits: he had not run the app, he might have made mistakes, and some leaked WhatsApp content was encrypted. From that server, he wrote, messages go on to the destination each customer sets: Microsoft 365, a mail server or a file server. The record that settles the point is the CVE. NVD’s entry for CVE-2025-47729 says the TeleMessage archiving backend through 5 May 2025 held cleartext copies of messages from TM SGNL users, which it calls different from what the documentation described.

So besides the phones and the customer’s own archive, every archived conversation also passed, readable, through a vendor server the customer did not run and could not inspect.

The open diagnostic address. The archive server was a Java application built with Spring Boot. Spring Boot can expose management pages for troubleshooting, and one of them, /heapdump, returns what GreyNoise describes as a heap dump of roughly 150MB that can hold plaintext usernames and passwords. On a server that relays messages, that includes the messages passing through. According to an anonymous hacker who described the method to Micah Lee on 3 May 2025, the path /management/heapdump on archive.telemessage.com returned such a snapshot, about 150 MB, to anyone who requested it, with no login. The hacker’s own estimate was that the whole intrusion took about 15 to 20 minutes, starting from a separate login page where they noticed that passwords were hashed with MD5 in the browser before being sent. These details are the hacker’s account as relayed by Lee.

The official records describe the same weak points. NVD’s entry for CVE-2025-48927 says the TeleMessage service configured Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at /heapdump, and CVE-2025-48928 says the heap content worked like a core dump containing a password previously sent over HTTP. Both entries say the flaws were exploited in the wild in May 2025.

What was taken. 404 Media, in a report by Joseph Cox and Micah Lee on 4 May 2025, wrote that the hacker reached archived chats of some users of the Signal clone and of the modified WhatsApp, Telegram and WeChat apps, including material related to US Customs and Border Protection, Coinbase and other financial institutions, judging by screenshots it obtained. Coinbase told TechCrunch it had no evidence that sensitive customer information was accessed. On 19 May 2025 the transparency group DDoSecrets published 410 GB of heap dumps taken on 4 May 2025, per Lee, some holding message text and some only senders, recipients and times, and shared them only with journalists and researchers.

step by step

  1. a compliance version of an encrypted appTM SGNL was built on Signal and sold with encryption promised all the way to the customer's archive.
  2. readable copies leave the phoneAfter decryption the app sent each message to TeleMessage's own archive server, which NVD later said held cleartext copies.the assumption breaks here
  3. 3 to 4 May 2025the archive server gives up its memoryA hacker says a diagnostic address on archive.telemessage.com returned a Java heap dump without any login; dumps dated 4 May were later published.
  4. 5 May 2025Smarsh suspends TeleMessageSmarsh said it had engaged an external firm and temporarily suspended all TeleMessage services.
  5. 12 May and 1 July 2025CISA lists the flaws as exploitedThe cleartext archive, the open heap dump endpoint and the password in memory all enter the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

how it surfaced

The app drew attention in the first days of May 2025, after a news photograph showed a senior US government official using it, as Lee’s 6 May write-up recounts. A hacker then contacted reporters. On 5 May 2025 Smarsh said, in a statement quoted by TechCrunch, that it had acted to contain a potential security incident, engaged an external cybersecurity firm and that “all TeleMessage services have been temporarily suspended”.

CISA added CVE-2025-47729, the cleartext archive, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 12 May 2025, and CVE-2025-48927 and CVE-2025-48928 on 1 July 2025. For each, the required action ends with discontinuing use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. GreyNoise, in vendor research published on 17 July 2025, counted 11 IP addresses trying to exploit the heap dump flaw as of 16 July. Smarsh told GovInfoSecurity on 18 July 2025 that the flaw had been fully remediated in its environment in early May, that fixes were applied centrally with no action needed from customers, and that later attempts had failed. None of the Smarsh statements cited here says how many customers or users had messages in the dumps, and no other source cited here gives that number.

The question in the customer access guide, who at a vendor can see your data, had a plain answer here: whoever could reach the vendor’s archive server. A tool slipped between a person and their messages is the kind of door three new doors describes, and a promise on a product page is a claim about a design until someone checks it, which is the point of the audit report guide. The same shape shows up at DeepSeek, where a vendor’s own open database held what customers sent, and at McHire, where the vendor’s side door stayed open.

An archive copy is only as private as every server it passes through, and some of those servers belong to the vendor.

Pick one tool that copies your messages, calls or mail for record-keeping and find out whether its vendor can read them on the way.

picture it at a company like yours

The company here is made up. The other two paths are not: they happened, and each links to the story.

your company
a normal dayYour sales team uses a popular encrypted chat app on work phones, and a compliance add-on keeps a copy of every conversation for the regulator.
the gap nobody seesThe add-on passes each message through its vendor's server in readable form, and nobody at your company has ever asked where that server is or who can reach it.a connected app with standing access
  1. in this story
    the day it mattersA setting left on at the vendor lets a stranger download that server's memory.
    what it costs youClient conversations you were required to protect turn up in someone else's files, and the encryption you paid for never covered that leg.
  2. or it goes like this
    howA chat tool's key into your CRM is stolen from the vendor.
    what leavessupport tickets, including passwords pasted into themwho ends up with itan extortion group working through hundreds of companies
    it happenedSalesloft / Drift, 2025
  3. or it goes like this
    howIntegration keys to your code host are stolen from the integration vendor.
    what leavesyour private code and the secrets inside itwho ends up with itattackers looking for the next door
    it happenedGitHub OAuth tokens, 2022

sources

  1. NVD: CVE-2025-47729, TeleMessage archiving backend holds cleartext copies of messages (published 8 May 2025)
  2. NVD: CVE-2025-48927, TeleMessage service exposes Spring Boot Actuator heap dump endpoint (published 28 May 2025)
  3. NVD: CVE-2025-48928, TeleMessage heap content includes a password previously sent over HTTP (published 28 May 2025)
  4. CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, entries for CVE-2025-47729 (added 12 May 2025) and CVE-2025-48927 and CVE-2025-48928 (added 1 July 2025)
  5. Smarsh: Smarsh completes acquisition of TeleMessage, extends communications compliance leadership (20 February 2024)
  6. Micah Lee: Despite misleading marketing, Israeli company TeleMessage, used by Trump officials, can access plaintext chat logs (6 May 2025)
  7. Micah Lee: How the knock-off Signal app used by Trump officials got hacked in 20 minutes (18 May 2025)
  8. Micah Lee: DDoSecrets publishes 410 GB of heap dumps, hacked from TeleMessage's archive server (19 May 2025)
  9. 404 Media: The Signal clone the Trump admin uses was hacked (4 May 2025)
  10. TechCrunch: TeleMessage, a modified Signal clone used by US government officials, has been hacked (5 May 2025)
  11. GreyNoise: active exploit attempts against a Signal-based messaging app (17 July 2025)
  12. GovInfoSecurity: attackers target legacy code in TeleMessage's Signal clone (18 July 2025)

← all myths

your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Ask your message archiving vendor, in writing, where your messages are readable between the phone and your archive.

    List every tool that captures chat, text or call content for compliance, including add-ons inside phone management. Ask each vendor three things: does any server of theirs hold the content unencrypted, even briefly; who on their side can reach that server; and when they last checked it for exposed diagnostic or management pages. TeleMessage's documentation promised encryption to the corporate archive, and the CVE record says its own server held the messages in clear text.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

the letter · every two weeks

one access gap in your inbox, with the fix.

Every issue takes one way access creeps in, shows a real incident where it went wrong, and ends with one thing to check that week. Written for the people who run the tools, without a security team behind them.

  • 1one mechanism, explained plainly
  • 2one real incident, taken apart
  • 3one step you can take on Monday

get the next issue

One email every two weeks. Your address stays here and is never passed to vendors. One click to unsubscribe. Privacy.