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domain hijacking

Whoever can change where your domain points receives your website visitors, your email and every password reset that trusts an address on it.

in one lineDomain hijacking is when an outsider gains control of where a company domain or subdomain points, by taking over the account that manages it, a record inside it, or the name itself.

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1what it is

A domain is a name plus a few instructions: which servers answer for it, where its email goes, where its website lives. Domain hijacking is someone else changing them, while the registration can stay in your name.

CISA described the pattern in Emergency Directive 19-01 of 22 January 2019, now closed: steal the login of an account that can change DNS, point the address, mail or nameserver records at your own servers, then obtain valid certificates so visitors see no warning.

Four ways in show up in the record:

  • The registrar account, through its login or the registrar's account recovery.
  • The DNS host, sometimes a separate vendor with its own users and API tokens.
  • A dangling record: a subdomain still pointing at a cloud resource the company deleted, which someone else can claim.
  • A lapsed domain: a name the company stopped renewing, open to whoever buys it next.

2why it accumulates

The account is set up once. The registrar login is created the day the domain is bought, at some companies by one person, with whatever sign-in options existed that year. The founder departure guide covers what happens when that person leaves holding it.

The vendor changes underneath you. Between 9 and 12 July 2024, attackers took over domains that had been migrated from Google Domains to Squarespace; Krebs on Security counted at least a dozen organisations hit. Squarespace's postmortem blames "a weakness related to OAuth logins". Researchers quoted by Krebs said an attacker could create an unverified account with an email tied to a migrated domain before its owner did. The cause is disputed; see the Squarespace domains incident page.

The support desk can undo your settings. dYdX's postmortem says its domain was taken a second time on 23 July 2024 through "a human-initiated reset by Squarespace's customer service", that the reset bypassed two-factor sign-in, and that the other admins were not contacted. That is dYdX relaying what Squarespace told it. The helpdesk reset guide covers the same move against your own help desk.

Records outlive what they point at. Microsoft's documentation on dangling DNS walks through it: a subdomain points at a cloud resource, the resource is deleted, the record stays, and whoever creates a resource with the same name receives the traffic. Microsoft calls it a common, high-severity threat where resources are created and deleted often.

Old names get dropped. After a rebrand or a shutdown, nobody renews the old domain. ICANN's Expired Registration Recovery Policy has registrars of generic top-level domains send at least two reminders, about a month and a week before expiry. If the contact address belongs to someone who left, they reach nobody.

3what it costs you

Your email, and through it your accounts. The Security Alliance (SEAL) noted in an advisory of 21 August 2025 that an attacker who changes a domain's mail records can intercept its email, and with it the password resets of accounts registered on the domain. After recovery, it advises checking for backdoor admin accounts.

A copy that looks genuine. Control of the name yields valid certificates, as CISA's directive and Microsoft's dangling DNS page both note. Microsoft adds that a taken-over subdomain can harvest session cookies shared across subdomains. The certificates guide covers who can issue certificates for your domain.

Money, directly. dYdX says two users lost approximately $31,000 in its second hijack, to its knowledge when it published. The Squarespace and dYdX hijacks hit crypto projects, where a fake site pays within minutes. Elsewhere the prize is the mail.

The accounts of people who left. In vendor research published on 13 January 2025, Truffle Security says it bought a failed startup's domain, recreated former employees' addresses and used Sign in with Google to reach their old accounts at services including Slack, Zoom and an HR system. It counted over 100,000 such domains for sale, using Crunchbase data.

what it looks like when it goes wrong

Three ways this tends to go, each one taken from a real case.

your company
the gap nobody seesThe login that can repoint your domain was set up once, and nobody has opened it since.a help desk that resets on request
  1. howA caller poses as an admin and gets a password and code reset in minutes.
    what leavesadmin control of identity and cloudwho ends up with itattackers who deploy ransomware
    it happenedMGM Resorts, 2023
  2. howAn outsourced desk resets an account three times without checking the caller.
    what leavesa fully working employee loginwho ends up with itan intruder who looks legitimate everywhere
    it happenedClorox and Cognizant, 2023
  3. howThe support vendor itself is talked into giving access.
    what leavesthe customer databasewho ends up with itan extortion group
    it happenedCaesars Entertainment, 2023

4what works for a small company

Give the domain an owner. One person accountable for the registrar and the DNS host, a second who can get in, both on company accounts.

Move recovery off the domain. SEAL's advisory recommends a separate email address for the registrar account.

Use the strongest sign-in offered. SEAL names authenticator apps and security keys; CISA's directive advised against text-message codes.

Ask the registrar, in writing, how its support desk resets an account and whether the other admins are told before MFA is removed.

Know what the locks do. ICANN's status code page says the transfer lock tells the registry to reject transfer requests, and that client codes are set by registrars. It does nothing about nameserver changes, which is how the Squarespace and dYdX domains were moved. Verisign's registry lock for .com and .net adds a phone call to an authorised person at the registrar, who must give a security phrase.

Delete the record with the resource. Microsoft's guidance puts "remove DNS entry" on the decommissioning checklist, with a regular review that every subdomain points at something you still own.

Retire old domains on purpose. Keep renewing any domain that ever carried email, or move every account registered on it before letting it go.

Watch for changes. Alert on nameserver and mail record changes, and watch Certificate Transparency logs for certificates nobody requested, as CISA asked of agencies.

If your registrar's support desk got a convincing call about your domain tomorrow, what would the caller need to know?

on the record

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your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    Open your registrar and DNS host accounts and list every user, API token and recovery email.

    Each of them can repoint the domain. A recovery email on the same domain means the account guards its own way back in, so once the mail is redirected, the next reset link goes to whoever redirected it.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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