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payroll diversion

The one person allowed to change where a salary goes is the employee, and anyone signed in as them counts as the employee. Nobody notices until payday.

in one linePayroll diversion is when someone posing as an employee changes where that employee's pay goes, so the next salary lands in an account the attacker controls.

the numbers

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1what it is

Employees can change the bank account their salary goes to, either in a self-service HR portal or by asking HR or payroll to do it for them. Payroll diversion is someone else using one of those two routes while posing as the employee.

The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has described both. Its alert of 18 September 2018 covers phishing for an employee's login, signing in to the payroll account and changing the bank details. Its alert of 10 September 2019 covers spoofed emails to HR or payroll that appear to come from employees asking to update their direct deposit, and files this version under business email compromise. The record is mostly American and Canadian, where salaries go by direct deposit, but the mechanism needs only what any payroll has: a bank field the employee owns and a login that opens it.

This is the short version of the payroll guide. Supplier payments, where a second approver checks the same screen as the first, are in the payment approval guide.

2why it keeps working

The field has an owner and often no approver. Some systems add a second check: Oracle's JD Edwards documentation describes self-service deposit changes that someone in payroll must approve before the database is updated. Where no such step exists, the employee's login is the whole control.

The HR portal inherits the email login. In vendor research published on 9 October 2025, Microsoft Threat Intelligence described an actor it tracks as Storm-2657 phishing staff at US universities, some on accounts without MFA and others through relay pages that captured MFA codes. With the mailbox session it reached Workday through single sign-on and changed payroll and bank details. Microsoft wrote that the attacks did not represent any vulnerability in Workday. How a relayed session gets past MFA is covered in the session theft explainer.

The warning goes to the mailbox the attacker holds. The FBI's 2018 alert describes rules that stop the employee receiving alerts about direct deposit changes. Microsoft's 2025 report describes inbox rules deleting Workday notifications, and its 9 April 2026 report on an actor it calls Storm-2755, in Canada, describes rules moving any mail containing "direct deposit" or "bank" into a hidden folder. The FBI's alert of 24 April 2025 on fake employee self-service sites adds a flood of spam to bury the genuine notice.

Sending HR requests to the portal is not enough on its own. In the one Storm-2755 loss Microsoft describes, the attacker emailed HR from the stolen session, HR replied with instructions for changing the details, and the attacker then signed in to Workday as the victim and made the change itself.

3what it costs you

The FBI's 2019 alert counted 1,053 complaints about the HR-email version between 1 January 2018 and 30 June 2019, with $8,323,354 in reported losses and an average of $7,904 per complaint. It said the new account generally led to a prepaid card. That is the last payroll-only count found in the FBI's public alerts. IC3's 2025 annual report counts 24,768 business email compromise complaints and $3,046,598,558 in reported losses, with no separate line for payroll, so nobody can say from public data how common diversion is today.

The loss lands on a person. An employee finds out on payday that the salary went somewhere else, and the company has to decide who covers it and how fast. Settle that question with someone qualified before it comes up.

The account also stays useful to the attacker. Microsoft's 2025 report says Storm-2657 enrolled its own phone numbers as MFA devices on victim accounts and used the compromised mailboxes to send phishing to other universities: 11 compromised accounts at three universities since March 2025 sent phishing to nearly 6,000 email accounts across 25 universities.

what it looks like when it goes wrong

Three ways this tends to go, each one taken from a real case.

your company
the gap nobody seesA bank change made from the employee's own session looks like a normal self-service update, and the warning email goes to the inbox the attacker is reading.a payment that can be approved on trust
  1. howA video call full of deepfaked executives asks for urgent transfers.
    what leavesmoney, in several transfers in one daywho ends up with itfraudsters who built the call
    it happenedArup deepfake fraud, 2024
  2. howInvoices arrive in a real supplier's name with new bank details.
    what leavesmonths of supplier paymentswho ends up with ita fraudster abroad
    it happenedFacebook and Google, 2019
  3. howAn employee gets a convincing request and sends several wires.
    what leavesmoney that is not recoveredwho ends up with ita criminal scheme
    it happenedOrion, 2024

4what works

  1. Review bank changes before every pay run. Pull the list of changes since the last payroll and have someone other than the person who processed them confirm each one with the employee, on a number recorded before the change or in person. The FBI's 2019 alert recommends secondary channels to verify requests for changes in account information.
  2. Never change bank details because an email asked. HR points every request to the portal, and treats a request that arrives by email as a reason to call the employee.
  3. Send the notice somewhere the attacker is not. Checkwriters' release notes for its employee self-service describe a change-request email sent to every valid address on the employee's record, personal ones included, even if the employee opted out of email contact, so they can warn the employer before the request is accepted. Ask your provider for the same, or a text.
  4. Put phishing-resistant sign-in in front of HR. Both Microsoft reports recommend it. The passkeys guide covers the methods a relay page cannot use.
  5. Look for the rules and the extra devices. In Exchange Online, Microsoft's Get-InboxRule command lists a mailbox's inbox rules, and its IncludeHidden switch adds hidden ones. Microsoft's 2025 response steps include reviewing recently added MFA devices and removing malicious inbox rules. For Google Workspace, the mail layer guide explains why filters are hard to see.

If an employee called on payday to say the salary never arrived, who at your company would know where to look first?

on the record

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your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    List every payroll bank change since the last pay run and confirm each one with the employee on a number recorded before the change.

    An attacker inside the HR portal can edit the phone number in the same session, so only a number from before the change, or a word in person, reaches the real employee.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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