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social media account takeover

Your brand accounts speak to customers in the company's name, and each one can be reset or reused by whoever holds one person's phone, inbox or laptop.

in one lineSocial media account takeover is when an outsider gains control of an account that speaks in a company's name, through its login, its recovery path, a signed-in session or an access grant.

the numbers

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1what it is

The LinkedIn page, the Facebook page and Instagram profile, the YouTube channel and the handle on X all talk in the company's name. A takeover is someone else posting, messaging or running ads from them.

Four ways in show up in the record:

  • The recovery path. The SEC said on 22 January 2024 that an unauthorized party took control of the phone number tied to its X account through the telecom carrier, in an apparent SIM swap, and then reset the password.
  • A password with no working second factor. The Register reported on 11 January 2024 that Mandiant's investigation into the takeover of its own X account pointed to a likely brute-force attack.
  • A stolen browser session. Google's Threat Analysis Group described in October 2021 malware that stole YouTube creators' session cookies, which open an account without the password.
  • An access request someone accepted. Meta's Business Help Center warns that scammers send page access requests, some claiming to be Facebook or offering to get the business verified.

2why it accumulates

The accounts hang on people. LinkedIn page admins are personal member profiles, and LinkedIn's help page says its support cannot give admin information to a page's members or employees. A YouTube Brand Account has one primary owner, and YouTube's help page says deleting that owner's account deletes the channel.

Recovery is set once. The phone and email belong to whoever opened the account. X's help page on compromised accounts says support sends instructions to the email associated with the account. If that inbox belonged to someone who left, so does the way back. The founder departure guide covers what happens when that someone is the founder.

A second factor gets switched off to fix a problem. The SEC said multi-factor authentication on its account had been disabled by X Support at staff request in July 2023, because of trouble getting in. It was still off on 9 January 2024.

Platforms change their rules. X's help page says text-message codes stopped working for non-Premium accounts on 20 March 2023. In its post on X, as quoted by The Register, Mandiant blamed "team transitions and a change in X's 2FA policy" for leaving its account not adequately protected.

Sessions live on the manager's laptop. Meta said on 3 May 2023 that malware groups first go after the personal accounts of people who manage business pages, some with malware that attempts to evade two-factor authentication. The session token theft topic explains why a stolen session survives the login.

3what it costs you

A false statement in your name. The SEC says the post claiming approval of bitcoin exchange-traded funds went out at 4:11 pm Eastern on 9 January 2024, and access ended between 4:40 and 5:30 pm. According to the US Department of Justice, bitcoin's price rose by more than $1,000 after the post and fell by more than $2,000 after the correction.

Your followers become the targets. Mandiant says its account was used on 3 January 2024 to spread links to a cryptocurrency drainer phishing page. Google's Threat Analysis Group says hijacked creator channels were sold or rebranded for crypto scam live streams, with prices from $3 to $4,000 depending on subscribers, and that it blocked 1.6 million messages to targets.

Ads on your card. Meta's May 2023 post says the aim was to run unauthorized ads from compromised business accounts.

A phone number is a soft target. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center reported on 8 February 2022 that it received 1,611 SIM swap complaints in 2021, with adjusted losses of more than $68 million. The notice names impersonating the victim, bribing carrier staff and phishing carrier employees as the methods. A company account that recovers to a personal number shares that risk.

what it looks like when it goes wrong

Three ways this tends to go, each one taken from a real case.

your company
the gap nobody seesThe recovery phone and email on the company's accounts belong to whoever set them up, and nobody has checked them since.a password is the only lock
  1. howLeaked passwords are tried against customer accounts until some open.
    what leavespersonal details of customers and their contactswho ends up with itfraudsters
    it happened23andMe, 2023
  2. howAn old password opens a data store that never required a second step.
    what leavesthe whole database in one downloadwho ends up with itan extortion group
    it happenedThe Snowflake wave, 2024
  3. howA stolen password gets through the one remote-access door without a code.
    what leavescontrol of the systems customers rely onwho ends up with ita ransomware crew
    it happenedChange Healthcare, 2024

4what works for a small company

Name an owner and a second admin for every account. Meta recommends more than one page admin so someone you trust can get you back in; YouTube recommends at least one other owner on a Brand Account.

Move recovery off personal phones. Recovery email on a role address, second factor on an authenticator app or security key. The UK NCSC's guidance for organisations, "Social media: protecting what you publish", says to switch on 2-step verification wherever it is offered. The passkeys guide covers sign-in that cannot be phished.

Write down any time a second factor is turned off, with who turns it back on and by when.

Remove people and agencies when they leave. NCSC advises removing access that is no longer needed, ideally before someone moves or leaves, as part of the joiners, movers and leavers process. Meta advises denying access requests from businesses you do not know.

Publish from work devices and sign out old sessions. NCSC recommends work devices for social media staff. X's help page notes that a password change does not sign its iOS and Android apps out.

Know the way back before you need it. NCSC says to learn each platform's recovery options in advance, since regaining control comes first after a hijack. The helpdesk reset guide shows the same phone trick played on your own support desk, and the domain hijacking topic covers the registrar side.

If the phone that recovers your company's X account were moved to a stranger's SIM tonight, whose phone would that be?

on the record

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your turn

what you can do about it

  1. this week

    For each company social account, write down the recovery phone, the recovery email and the second factor, and who holds each.

    Whoever holds those three can reset the account, whatever the admin list says. Move any that belong to one person, or to someone who left, to a role address and an authenticator app or security key.

  2. go deeper

  3. if you're not sure where to start

    Run the offboarding checklist on one leaver. It covers every account and token to close when someone leaves.

    open the checklist →

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